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ABSTRACT
It is sometimes the case that a debate goes off the rails so early that
riders assume the rough country around them is the natural backdrop for
their travels. That is certainly true in the debate over reparations in
transitions to democracy. Reparations traditionally are understood as
material or symbolic awards to victims of an abusive regime granted
outside of a legal process. While some reparations claims succeed—such
as those made by Americans of Japanese descent interned during World
War II and those made by European Jews against Germany after World
War II—most do not. The principal culprits in these failures are objections
that reflect commitments to “ethical individualism.”
By way of response, some advocates attempt to put reparations back on
course by appealing to theories of collective responsibility. Where put
strongly, these theories suffer from basic conceptual deficits. Weaker
versions, such as theories based on moral taint and related efforts that
seek atonement or reconciliation, turn on moral sentiments, such as
regret, and therefore cannot give rise to objective and externally
enforceable duties of repair. More creative solutions, such as approaches
pursuing “restorative justice,” have some intuitive appeal but want for
theoretical clarity and therefore fail to provide persuasive practical
guidance.
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This Article proposes a new approach. Rather than conceiving of
reparations as solely retrospective, which implicates knotty issues of
responsibility, or solely prospective, which raises problems of
enforceability and political practicality, this Article argues that
reparations are Janus-faced. In keeping with a larger project arguing that
transitional justice is not just a special case of ordinary justice, this
Article suggests treating transitions as liminal moments and contends that
reparations ought to reflect the extraordinary conditions implied by this
temporal status “betwixt and between” 1 an abusive past and a future
committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“It wasn’t me!” 2 There is, perhaps, no defense claim more
fundamental. It reflects the basic proposition that we can only be held to
account for what we do and the harm we cause. This intuition is
ubiquitous in normative fields of law and moral philosophy, where oceans
of ink have been spilled3 teasing out the nuances and applications of a
proposition that all three-year-olds understand: we do not punish people
for crimes they did not commit. 4 With few exceptions, we do not hold
people liable for harms they did not cause. We do not bind people to
agreements to which they have not bound themselves.
Perhaps because the claim that innocence matters is so ubiquitous, or
perhaps because it is just True, there is no better way to poke the limbic
bear of moral outrage than to hold one person responsible for conduct not
his own or to order him to compensate for harms he has not caused.
Thence the most basic challenges to theories of vicarious and strict
liability—which usually respond by identifying a voluntary act or
informed decision that may serve to anchor liability—arise and, thus, our
ready willingness to let ten guilty men go free rather than embrace
procedures that risk convicting one innocent man. 5
This quaint little commitment to punish only the guilty and to hold
liable only those responsible is also at the heart of contests over
2. SHAGGY, It Wasn’t Me, on HOT SHOT (MCA Records 2000); see also David Gray, It Wasn’t
Me, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/01/it_
wasnt_me.html (discussing Paul Bloom, First Person Plural, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2008, at 90).
3. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, chs. 1–5 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publishing Co., Inc. 2000); A.J. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271
(1954); H.L.A. HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 90
(1968); Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 295 (2004); Peter
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962); B.A.O. Williams & T. Nagel,
Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 115, 137 (1976).
4. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 246 (1952) (emphasizing standards of liability
and the central role of presumption of innocence in American jurisprudence).
5. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[F]or my part I think it a less[er] evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.”); Alexander Volokh, N
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 (1997).
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reparations. 6 The protest is particularly pronounced in domestic debates
about reparations for slavery. 7 Contemporary whites asked to contribute
directly or through taxes protest that they have never owned slaves 8 and
were born generations after the practice was abolished. 9 Some even point
out, with varying degrees of accuracy, that nobody in their family has ever
owned slaves. 10 If they have no direct, or at least personal, connection to
the abuses, it seems beyond contest that they should not be held
responsible for paying compensation11—an objection only amplified by
the fact that the proposed beneficiaries were never themselves slaves.12
These same concerns were cited in the record of a recent Senate
6. See, e.g., When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for
Human Injustice 3, 8 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter Brooks, When Sorry Isn’t Enough];
Lawrie Balfour, Reparations After Identity Politics, 33 POL. THEORY 786, 794 (2005); Roy L. Brooks,
Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
251 (2004) [hereinafter Brooks, Reparations]; Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms with Our Past,
Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750, 752–53 (2004);
Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 49–52 (2004); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2003); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives
Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765–68 (2005); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691,
698–704 (2003) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Reparations]; Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for
Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 183, 185–86 (2006).
7. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE
REPARATIONS (2000); SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS
(Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) [hereinafter SHOULD AMERICA PAY?]; Brooks, Reparations, supra
note 6; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6; Sepinwall, supra note 6; Robert W. Tracinski,
America’s “Field of the Blackbirds”: How the Campaign for Reparations for Slavery Perpetuates
Racism, 3 J.L. SOC’Y 145 (2002); Watson Branch, Comment, Reparations for Slavery: A Dream
Deferred, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 177 (2002); cf. RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Eric K. Yamamoto et al. eds., 2001).
8. See Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 184 n.10 (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde claiming that “I never
owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don’t know that I should have to pay for someone who
did [own slaves] generations before I was born.”) (alteration in original).
9. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First
Take Account of Race”, in 2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT
“SOLVES” THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ISSUE 83, 88 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1998); Tracinski, supra note 7,
at 151; see also Bob Gibson, Slavery Apology Measure Ignites Legislative Debate, CHARLOTTESVILLE
DAILY PROGRESS, Jan. 16, 2007, available at http://www.dailyprogress.com/cdp/news/local/local_
govtpolitics/article/slavery_apology_measure_ignites_legislative_debate1/13699/ (quoting Del. Frank
D. Hargrove in opposition to a proposed resolution apologizing for slavery saying, “The present
commonwealth has nothing to do with slavery.”).
10. Balfour, supra note 6, at 794. For example, Sen. John McCain famously denied that his
family owned slaves when, in fact, they did. See Douglas A. Blackmon, Two Families Named McCain,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008, at A1.
11. See Roy L. Brooks, Toward a Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave Redress, 6 AFR.-AM. L.
& POL’Y REP. 49, 61 (2004) [hereinafter Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused]; Gregory Kane, Why the
Reparations Movement Should Fail, 3 MARGINS 189, 197 (2003).
12. Miller, supra note 6, at 52; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 151.
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Resolution apologizing for slavery and Jim Crow laws, which declined to
endorse claims for reparation. 13 While cast historically, these objections
are nothing more than the familiar “I didn’t do it. It wasn’t me.” 14
Similar objections play a common and powerful role in transitional
justice debates. 15 Transitional justice asks what a successor regime
committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law can and should
do to achieve justice for human rights abuses perpetrated by and under an
abusive forebear. 16 “Transitional justice is a field on an upward
trajectory” 17 that recently has emerged as an interdiscipline in its own
right, 18 but the animating question dates back at least to 405 BC after the
fall of the twelve tyrants. 19 Contemporary interest in transitional justice
reflects the encouraging decline over the last twenty years or so of
autocratic states committed to institutionalized human rights violations as
part of the “Third Wave” of democratization. 20 In the wake of this
tsunami, a number of states have proposed reparations as at least a partial
response to past wrongs. 21
While the atrocities addressed in transitional justice debates are of
more recent vintage than the United States’ history of slavery, the
13. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009) (officially recognizing and apologizing for the wrongs
and persisting consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws but disclaiming, “Nothing in this resolution
. . . authorizes or supports any claim against the United States . . . .”).
14. See Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146; see also Miller, supra note 6, at 53–54 (recounting two
comedy gambits, one by Chris Rock and the other by Wanda Sykes, in which these black comedians
approached whites on the streets to request reparations payments and were met variously with disbelief
and outrage).
15. See, e.g., KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 41–43 (1948) (noting that
claims of innocence were common in post-World War II Germany).
16. David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2621, 2621–23 (2006) [hereinafter Gray, Excuse-Centered].
17. Kieran McEvoy, Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‘Thicker’ Version of Transitional
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 15 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., 2008).
18. Contemporary conversations about transitional justice began with a debate in print between
Professors Diane Orentlicher and Carlos Nino published in the Yale Law Journal. See Carlos S. Nino,
The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE
L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641 (1991); Diane
F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,
100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
19. JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS 3–23 (2004); PLATO, APOLOGY 32b–e (G.M.A. Grube
trans., 1981).
20. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
21. For example, reparations have been part of transitional justice efforts in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Malawi, South Africa, and the United States in response to the
internment of persons of Japanese descent during World War II, among others. See PRISCILLA
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 7 (2002); THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2008).
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objections are familiar.22 Many asked to pay disclaim the past regime and
contend that they did not personally commit human rights abuses.23 Those
directly connected to atrocities argue that they relied on existing law,
which told them that targeted abuses against a particular group were right,
necessary, or at least not illegal.24 While those in this latter group cannot
claim that they did not do it, they can displace responsibility to the state or
protest that imposing liability would violate prohibitions against ex post
facto enforcement of law. Whether packaged as “I didn’t do it” or “I didn’t
do anything wrong,” the core objection is the same.
Reparations advocates share the foundational belief that only the guilty
should be punished and only those responsible can be held liable.
Unfortunately, this commitment seems to impose an insurmountable
barrier against collective funding of reparations, which is the only realistic
way to provide the necessary finances. The halfhearted solution has been
to sketch theories of associational responsibility, derivative collective
responsibility, or moral taint. 25 These attempts seldom persuade, and for
good reason. They run full-force into the individualism fundamental to our
common intuitions of blame and responsibility. 26 Other reparations
supporters have sought to change the debate by appealing to theories of
“restorative justice” that eschew entanglement with the past in favor of a
future-oriented focus on reconciliation 27 or redemption. 28 These novel
efforts raise their own conceptual concerns.29 Perhaps worse, they fail to
22. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000); HAYNER, supra note 21; MICHAEL HENDERSON, FORGIVENESS:
BREAKING THE CHAIN OF HATE (2d rev. ed. 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT: YEARBOOK
2001 (George Ulrich & Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003); POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Torpey ed., 2003); THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21.
23. Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1052.
24. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 711 (2004); Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at
2631–36; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 691. This is precisely the question with which the
German Constitutional Court struggled in the “Border Guard Cases.” See 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
576 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (English translation of proceeding in Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js
48/90 (9/91)).
25. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 113–
45 (2000); LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 151 (1992); Anthony Appiah, Racism and Moral
Pollution, 18 PHIL. FORUM 185 (1987); Marina A. L. Oshana, Moral Taint, in GENOCIDE’S
AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND REPAIR 71 (Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007). For
an extended explanation and critique of these concepts, see infra Part III.
26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept,
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind and an evil-doing hand, was
congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.”).
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 255.
29. See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
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lay any foundation for claims that reparations are imperative and also fail
to provide a robust normative justification for any particular form of
reparation.
More troubling than these theoretical worries are concerns that
reparations do not work. This is the most significant and least addressed
objection to reparations. Even where reparations are paid, the money itself
is insufficient to the task of reparation.30 Moreover, recipients frequently
remain in a persistent condition of material and social inequality. “Forty
acres and a mule,” the reparation promised by General Sherman to former
American slaves 31 and codified by Section Four of the Freedmen’s Bureau
Act, 32 was not even paid, 33 and lesser grants of land, goods, and money
certainly did not leave former slaves in a condition of justice.34 Many now
trace the absence and inadequacy of those reparations efforts to
contemporary achievement gaps between black and white Americans.35
Native American groups have, for the most part, fared no better despite
large land grants, mineral rights, and sovereign exemptions from state
regulations. 36 Reparations paid in South Africa 37 have done almost nothing
30. Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note
21, at 451, 465–66.
31. See William T. Sherman, Special Field Order No. 15 (Jan. 16, 1865), reprinted in THE
FORTY ACRES DOCUMENTS: WHAT DID THE UNITED STATES REALLY PROMISE THE PEOPLE FREED
FROM SLAVERY? 51 (House of Songhay Commission for Positive Education, 1994); Kane, supra note
11, at 194.
32. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (lapsed 1869), quoted in Berry v. United States,
No. C-94-0796-DLJ, 1994 WL 374537, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 1994). The Act expired in 1869.
Berry, 1994 WL374537, at *1.
33. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 52; Kane, supra note 11, at 195.
34. See Berry, 1994 WL 374537, at *1 (plaintiff seeking forty acres of land in San Francisco or
$3 million as compensation for slavery).
35. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009) (“African-Americans continue to suffer from the
consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws—long after both systems were formally abolished—
through enormous damage and loss, both tangible and intangible, including the loss of human dignity
and liberty. . . .”); cf. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 697–707; Miller, supra note 6, at 49; Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 173–
74 (2004).
36. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 53. This is not true of all Native American
groups. Leveraging their sovereignty, a number of tribes have established successful gaming
businesses, sometimes for group benefit and sometimes enriching a select few. See Edward D. Gehres
III, Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse, 17
J.L. & POL. 135, 141–45 (2001); Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots,
TIME, Dec. 23, 2002, at 52; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16,
2002, at 44. However, credit for those successes cannot credibly be traced to minimal reparations. See
generally Gehres, supra, at 144–45.
37. See Regulations Regarding Reparation to Victims R1660/2003, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK
OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 816; Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy, in 5 TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, vol. 5, ch. 5 (1998), reprinted in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 791; Warren Freedman, The Restitution of Land
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to improve the lot of black South Africans and arguably have left them in
a worse condition, occasioning deep ambivalence with the entire
transitional justice process. 38 Some victims of institutionalized human
rights abuses have made gains, but seldom if ever due to reparations. For
example, contemporary Japanese Americans bear the marks of
internment, 39 but, measured by demographic achievement, have made
significant economic and social gains in the interim. However, those gains
cannot credibly be explained by reparations, which were not paid until
1988 40 and, at any rate, were minimal and regarded as symbolic by most
recipients. 41 Even where the amount of reparation paid is more significant,
such as in Argentina, political realities and abiding guilt among survivors
concerned with spending “cursed money” limit the capacity of reparations
to significantly change the lot of victims or recipients. 42 The simple fact
that reparations programs largely fail to achieve any demonstrative gain
for victims has largely been ignored in practice and the literature.43
This Article proposes a new path. It contends that normative objections
to and the practical failures of reparations derive from some combination
of two conceptual mistakes. The first is to treat transitional justice
generally as a special case of ordinary justice, and reparations in particular
as a species of tort claim. The second is to engage in a temporal bias,
viewing reparations as either solely retrospective or entirely prospective.
In keeping with prior work contending that transitional justice is
extraordinary justice, 44 this Article argues that “I didn’t do it” is a non
Rights in South Africa as Reparation for Past Injustices, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 157
(2003).
38. Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 176, 189–90, 200.
39. LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHT A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE PASSAGE OF THE
CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988, 130–36 (1993).
40. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000); Civil Liberties Act Amendments
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-371, 106 Stat. 1167.
41. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redness: The Japanese American
Internment, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 257, 276.
42. See María José Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: The
Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 21, 46–47.
43. This is not to denigrate reparations entirely. Quite to the contrary, as is argued here,
reparations have an important role to play in a broader transitional justice program. Neither is it to
suggest that past reparations programs are entirely without merit or success. Rather, the point is that
because those programs have largely been limited in their scope, imagination, and attachment to a
broader program of transitional justice, those programs have at best achieved modest compensation for
material loss without addressing the underlying sources of those harms as consequences of targeted
violence. See infra Part IV.
44. See generally David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and
Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Gray, Devilry]; Gray, ExcuseCentered, supra note 16.
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sequitur in debates about reparations where the fundamental question is
“How do we make it right?”.
Part II provides an overview of the reparations debate. “Reparations”
encompasses a variety of potential responses to mass atrocities. This
section attempts to bring some order to the debate by charting the potential
forms reparations may take alongside their corresponding objections. Part
II then describes how these objections depend on one or both of the cited
conceptual mistakes: (1) treating reparations as tort claims, or (2)
assuming that reparations either are entirely retrospective or entirely
prospective. Part III reviews some of the most common justifications for
and defenses of reparations and points out how they too fall victim to one
or both of these cognitive mistakes and therefore fail to meet some or all
of the most compelling objections to reparations proposals. Part IV sets
the stage for a novel approach to reparations that takes seriously the
unique characteristics of transitions and transitional justice. In particular, it
argues that transitional justice is Janus-faced and that reparations are
liminal tools for addressing the social conditions that lie beneath
pretransitional abuses.
II. A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF REPARATIONS
All transitions are characterized by a disparity between needs and
resources. In addition to justice, new governments must ensure the peace,
achieve stability, reform public institutions, repair infrastructure, shift
social norms, and institutionalize commitments to human rights and the
rule of law. 45 These demands are extraordinary, and even with aid from
friendly states and international institutions, all transitions must make
difficult decisions. Some of the most troubling decisions are presented by
justice initiatives.
After the impulse to seek revenge, or perhaps as a consequence of it,
the most common instinct in the face of mass violence is to prosecute
everyone responsible. 46 Unfortunately, this is almost always impossible. 47
The abusive regimes that give way to transition are characterized by largescale abuses that involve the participation and complicity of tens, and
often hundreds, of thousands of individuals, agencies, and corporations.
45. HAYNER, supra note 21, at 11.
46. See ALEX BORAINE, A LIFE IN TRANSITION 203 (2008); HAYNER, supra note 21, at 12; Lisa
J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth
Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228, 242–43 (2007).
47. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 46, at 243.
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The resources—material, human, institutional, and political—needed to
prosecute everyone implicated in pretransitional violence far exceed those
available to transitional regimes, a shortfall only made worse by the fact
that justice programs must compete with other high-priority goals,
including stability and security. 48
This disparity between needs and resources confronts transitional
regimes with a “justice gap.” 49 Much of the practice of and academic
debate over transitional justice is caught up in attempts to span this gap,
usually by resort to hybrid programs featuring truth commissions,
reparations, formal or de facto amnesties, lustration, and limited criminal
trials focusing on those most responsible for past violence.50 However,
these efforts often are ad hoc and under theorized, leaving transitional
regimes and their constituents with the sense that they are settling for the
best justice possible given “very imperfect” circumstances51—one more
jab in the ribs of a people who have already borne extraordinary hardship.
The most common gap-filling measures deployed by transitional
regimes are truth commissions and reparations.52 Truth commissions offer
a procedure for examining and detailing past violence and attempt to fill
the forensic vacuum left in the wake of decisions not to prosecute by
providing an opportunity for victims, perpetrators, and witnesses to say
what happened in a forum imbued with official status.53 Reparations,
whether paid directly by wrongdoers or in their stead by the transitional
regime, attempt to fill accountability and compensation gaps by providing
recognition and partial redemption for victims while imposing on abusers
direct or derivative liability. 54 Some form of reparation has been a part of
almost every hybrid program of transitional justice.55 “Forty Acres” were
48. I am in debt to now-Representative Tom Perriello (D-Va.) for making the point that
transitional justice and security are not always at odds and for sharing his views on the role of justice
initiatives in achieving both short- and long-term stability.
49. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2624–29.
50. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355 (2002).
51. Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79
(1998); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Restitution, Retribution, Political Justice and the Rule of Law, 2
CONSTELLATIONS 309, 310 (1996); Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 647, 648 (1999).
52. HAYNER, supra note 21, at 170–73.
53. Id. at 14–23.
54. Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 124–32 (2004); De Greiff, supra note 30, at 460–61; Laplante & Theidon,
supra note 46, at 245; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6; Ruth Rubio-Marín & Pablo De
Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 318, 318–21 (2007).
55. See supra note 21; Balfour, supra note 6, at 787; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at
318. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35.
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offered to former slaves during Reconstruction as partial reparation for
their period of servitude, though the benefit was never paid. 56 Germany
paid reparations both to individual victims of the Holocaust and to the
state of Israel. 57 Japan offered monetary compensation to Korean “comfort
women,” despite denying the fact of the abuse, much less Japan’s
responsibility. 58 Reparations in various forms have been paid in South
Africa to victims of Apartheid. 59 Pursuant to legislative action, the United
States paid reparations to Japanese Americans and others confined to
internment camps during World War II. 60 Native Americans have also
received a string of purportedly reparatory payments and compensation
from the government of the United States. 61 More recently, some have
proposed truth and reconciliation committees in combination with
reparations, as partial justice for slavery, 62 Jim Crow laws, 63 and for the
legacy of lynching. 64
Each of these efforts has met with varying degrees of opposition. In
some cases, this opposition has simply limited the extent of the reparative
effort. In others, it has required that all payments be accompanied by a
denial of responsibility. 65 In the case of contemporary claims for slavery
56. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. In 2009, the Senate passed a resolution
formally apologizing for slavery, but specifically declined to recognize any right to reparation. S. Con.
Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). Whether the United States is a transitional regime, still coming to terms
with slavery and institutional racism, or posttransitional, is highly contested. While this Article does
not take a firm stand in the debate, the theory proposed here suggests that the United States would
benefit from addressing issues of racial inequality using insights and tools from the theory and practice
of transitional justice.
57. Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, German Reparations to the Jews After World War
II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21,
at 390; FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM’N, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GERMAN COMPENSATION
FOR NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMES (1996), reprinted in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra
note 6, at 61–67.
58. George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T
ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 113, 124.
59. Colvin, supra note 38, at 176–214.
60. See Civil Liberties Act of 1998, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000); BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T
ENOUGH, supra note 6, pt. 4; Yamamoto & Ebesugawa, supra note 41, at 257.
61. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 266–67.
62. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (advocating
reparations for slavery); Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 273–74 (noting important role for truthseeking procedures as part of larger project of slavery reparations); John Conyers Jr. with Jo Ann
Nichols Watson, Reparations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note
7, at 14 (advocating reparations for slavery).
63. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 395–400.
64. See SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF
LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 150–53 (2007).
65. See supra note 56; see also Guembe, supra note 42, at 46 (describing how concerns for
opposition driven by denials of responsibility limited public discussion of reparations efforts in
Argentina).
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reparations in the United States, opposition has frozen claims in their
political and legal tracks. Much of that debate and its consequences is both
deeply confused and deeply confusing. That is due in no small part to
imprecision. Therefore, the next section proposes a more refined model of
reparations on the way to a directed account of the main arguments in
opposition.
A. A Four-Dimensional Model of Reparations
As we will see in the next section, reparations 66 present a number of
challenges, both theoretical and concrete. 67 While much of the literature is
abstract, 68 there is a justifiable plea for a more structured debate attached
to specific proposals. 69 It seems intuitive, after all, that the nature of
challenges to reparations will depend on the form of the proposed
program, its intended beneficiaries, and the identity of those expected to
contribute. 70 Any topography of the debate landscape must then start with
typology of its inhabitants. That is the task in this section.
Broadly, the benefits distributed by reparation programs can be
categorized as either material or nonmaterial. 71 That is, reparations can
take the form of concrete benefits, such as cash payments,72 social welfare
entitlements, or guaranteed access to education and employment. 73
66. I am conscious of the fact that the extension of “reparation” is not a given in the literature.
Roy Brooks, for example, would limit “reparation” to forms of redress accompanied by a fulsome and
heartfelt apology. See Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 255–56. A more common definition is a
form of material or symbolic compensation provided in the absence of legal obligation or outside legal
process. See, e.g., De Greiff, supra note 30, at 452–53; Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and
Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1660 n.8 (1999); Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note
6, at 691–94. This Article, reflecting realities of the academic and public debate, will use “reparation”
more generally, achieving precision descriptively, rather than by contesting semantics.
67. See infra Part II.B.
68. See, e.g., Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 288 (calling for a “high-minded discussion of
morality and justice” before thinking about “the forms of redress, in all their possible configurations”).
69. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 689–90. But see Brooks,
Reparations, supra note 6, at 287 (asserting that examining concrete proposals in order to better
understand the form, content, and application of potential objections is “so very wrong”).
70. Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting A Path To Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 73, 77–78 (2001); Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 689.
71. Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6,
at 9 [hereinafter Brooks, The Age of Apology]; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 468–70; Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 725–36; Roht-Arriaza, Reparations, supra note 35, at 159–60; RubioMarín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 330–32; Ernesto Verdeja, A Normative Theory of Reparations in
Transitional Democracies, in GENOCIDE’S AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND REPAIR 166, 171–78
(Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007).
72. See, e.g., 1994 Fla. Laws 3296–98 (providing cash payments to victims and heirs of the
Rosewood Massacre); Eileen Finan, Delayed Justice: The Rosewood Story, 22 HUM. RTS. 8–9 (1995).
73. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000) (providing education funds for
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Reparations can also be more ethereal, including apologies, memorials,
and efforts to achieve social, cultural, and institutional reform. 74 Beyond
form, reparations also can be categorized according to who benefits and
who contributes. For example, reparations can be directed either toward
specific individuals or a group. 75 Likewise, those asked to contribute may
be selected individuals, groups, or states.76
Starting with the nature of the program and the proposed recipients, we
can understand the possibilities graphically, plotting the relationship
between recipients and benefits in two dimensions with one axis marking
nonmaterial from material benefits and the other distinguishing programs
benefitting identified individuals from programs designed to benefit a
group. 77 Populating the quadrants yields a helpful preliminary view of the
major forms that reparation programs have taken thus far. 78
subjects of World War II internments of Japanese Americans).
74. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 1 (“acknowledg[ing] the fundamental injustice of the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry during World War II” and “apologiz[ing] on behalf of the people of the United
States”); S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 268–72
(discussing various forms of reparation and redress); Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred, in
BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR 14, 23 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
2002).
75. Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 9; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 453; Posner &
Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 739–41; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 330–32;
Verdeja, Reparations, supra note 71, at 171–78.
76. See De Greiff, supra note 30, at 455–59; Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro:
A Psychological Perspective on Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra
note 21, at 560, 568–71; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 736–39.
77. Ernesto Verdeja has suggested a similar approach. See Verdeja, supra note 71, at 171–78
(suggesting a more limited typography of reparations proposals).
78. For examples of material and nonmaterial reparations directed at groups and individuals, see
Colvin, supra note 38, at 195.
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Individual Recipients

Non-Material
Benefits

Material
Benefits

Group Recipients

Other than the dimensional leap, adding payers to the picture appears
relatively straightforward. After all, individual wrongdoers are not in a
position to make an official apology or to establish days of remembrance,
just as the state cannot make personal apologies or payments from
wrongdoers’ accounts. However, upon closer examination there appears to
be much more involved than adding a z-axis. There are more variations in
possible contributors, suggesting a broader spectrum than can be captured
bimodally. For example, funding for group reparations or trust funds may
be drawn from public funds, from a particular group, or from individuals.
A potential w-axis raises similar concerns. Specifically, there is a range of
relationships with past atrocities that payers might have, running from
actual participation to complicity, to affiliation with offending groups, or
to no apparent relationship at all. So, while payers and the relationships of
payers to past abuses can be viewed graphically, spectrums better capture
the range of possibilities.
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Spectrum of Payers from State to Individual

Spectrum of Payers from Guilty to Not Associated

Of course, the actual party who bears the cost of a reparations program
may not be readily apparent. For example, some argue that affirmative
action programs, while administered generally, may actually impose costs
only on a relatively small group of individuals who, when not admitted to
a school or favored with a particular job, claim to have been displaced by
an affirmative action candidate. 79 There are many other distinctions that
might be made. For example, material payments may be classified as
settlements without admission of wrongdoing or as forms of atonement
entailing an apology. 80 While interesting in their own right, these are
downstream issues. For now, we can put to use this admittedly schematic
model to organize a discussion of arguments for and against reparations.
We are, then, presented with a four-dimensional picture of reparations
programs. We can locate any particular program as either providing
material or nonmaterial benefits to individuals or groups by states, groups,
or individuals who are actually responsible for, merely associated with, or
79. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, note 6, at 713, 729. But see Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1768 (1993) (arguing that these objections defend background
racial injustices as status quo). The consequent emotions of resentment that occasion such
circumstances may seed a backlash of identity politics. See Balfour, Reparations, supra note 6, at 788–
89.
80. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 8–9; Roy L. Brooks, Reply, in
BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 169–70.
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not associated at all with past atrocities. It is tempting when presented with
such a tool to play Linnaeus with actual cases. While engaging as an
intellectual exercise, that is not the project here. We are out for normative
rather than descriptive game. In that context, the most immediate question
is not where a particular program might be located in the overall scheme,
but the opportunities and challenges salient to any specific location. That
is the project for the next section.
B. Major Objections to Reparations
The mind numbs at the prospect of toiling through the details of the
thirty-six cells yielded by the outline proposed above. Fortunately, that is
not necessary. With few exceptions, the main objections to reparations
programs attach to the category distinctions, and therefore are common
across the cells in which any one appears. As is evidenced below, this
analytic approach identifies a few important themes.
1. Material Reparations
Reparations advocates frequently argue for some form of material
response to atrocity. 81 Material reparations, whether in the form of cash or
other compensation, face one main objection: fit. The principal
justification for material reparations is as compensation for harms
suffered. 82 That begs the question of how harms are measured, suggesting
an array of counterfactual possibilities, none of which seems fully
appropriate. 83 In language familiar from domestic tort contexts, recipients
frequently object that the compensation they receive is insufficient to
make them whole, 84 does not adequately account for their loss, 85 or is
nothing more than “blood money.” 86 Pressing the point farther, some
81. See, e.g., Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 275; Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:
Japanese Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 520 (1998).
82. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 104 (1998) [hereinafter
MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS].
83. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755.
84. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 104–05; Balfour, supra note 6, at
801; Kane, supra note 11, at 197.
85. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 104; IFILL, supra note 64, at 24;
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755; Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance
of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 651, 656–57 (2003).
86. Colvin, supra note 38, at 189; Colleen Duggan et al., Reparations for Sexual and
Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru, 2 INT’L J. OF
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 192, 210 (2008); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 751; Miller, supra note 6, at
52–57.
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critics of material reparations argue that they constitute a “one-time payoff trap,” 87 essentially closing the door on any subsequent justice claims. 88
Again singing familiar refrains, payers may object that material
reparations are too generous, too expensive, or not justified in light of the
harm suffered by recipients. 89 There are also broader administrative and
procedural difficulties with measuring harms, 90 which vary dramatically
between individuals and may become murky with the passage of time. 91
Cast as quasi-tort claims, material reparations also face heavy substantive
legal burdens that frequently cannot be met. 92
There is, of course, a host of other objections to material reparations
depending upon the combination of other elements, such as who pays and
who receives the compensation. However, as opposed to nonmaterial
reparations, the principal concern with material reparations is whether,
how, and to what extent payments fit the purported harm93 because
compensation is the raison d’être of material reparations. 94 These
objections connect to debates in critical theory and political science over
whether to measure social justice in terms of recognition or distribution of
resources. 95 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, for example, have engaged
in a book-length debate over whether the fundamental unit of injustice in
contemporary global society is material or status inequality. 96 If the
fundamental wrong suffered by victims of injustice is a refusal of
recognition in cultural and political institutions, then material remedies not
87. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 756.
88. Balfour, supra note 6, at 803; Westley, supra note 62, at 476.
89. Miller, supra note 6, at 52–57.
90. Id.
91. Ryan Fortson, Collective Liability, the Limited Prospects of Success for a Class Action Suit
for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White Racial Identity, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
REP. 71, 96 (2004).
92. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759–62 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Posner, J.); Brophy, supra note 54, at 121–29; Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1209 (2004).
93. Miller, supra note 6, at 59.
94. Emma Coleman Jordan, The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR. AM. L. &
POL’Y REP. 21, 25 (2004); Dinah Shelton, Right Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 844 (2002) (explaining that the purpose of reparations is “to
rectify the wrong done an injured party and correct injustice by restoring the status quo ante” and
noting that the International Law Commission has “opted for remedial justice” as the proper ground
for reparations claims).
95. See NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? (2003); AXEL
HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION (1995); Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in
the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM 105 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1994); Charles
Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1994).
96. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 71.
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only fail to address the problem, 97 but can actually reify the ontology
underlying the discrimination 98 or even inspire backlash. 99 Likewise, if the
manifest harm suffered is simply a matter of unjust denial of access to
resources, then apologies and days of remembrance are rendered symbolic
in the pejorative. 100 As is argued here, most abuses perpetrated by
pretransitional regimes have elements of both distributional and status
injustice. A successful reparations program must be cognizant of this
duality.
2. Nonmaterial Reparations
Objections to nonmaterial reparations are more multifarious. Those
asked to give apologies may object that they have nothing to apologize
for, 101 while recipients frequently complain that an apology is not nearly
enough. 102 Establishing a historical record of abuse inevitably casts
blame—frequently quite broadly—raising objections from those
implicated who may claim innocence while, again, providing victims at
most a “symbolic” benefit. Moreover, such histories are by necessity
incomplete, abstract, and essentializing, 103 which may leave many former
victims without even a sense of recognition, 104 raising serious concerns
about the animating purpose of such programs. 105
As constituents of an effort to establish an official narrative, truth
commissions, public monuments, and days of remembrance meet with
similar objections. 106 Those associated with blame may protest innocence.
97. Randall Robinson, What America Owes Blacks and What Blacks Owe to Each Other, 6 AFR.AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 12–13 (2004).
98. Balfour, supra note 6, at 787–89.
99. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1187–88 (2004); Kane, supra note 11, at 199; Glenn C. Loury,
Little to Gain, Much to Lose, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER ED., Nov. 8, 2001; Miller, supra note 6, at 46–
47, 48–56; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146, 156–57.
100. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Balfour, supra note 6, at 794; David Hall, The
Spirit of Reparation, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 8 (2004).
101. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715; Eva Jefferson Paterson,
The Importance of Slavery Reparations, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 15, 19 (2004); Tracinski, supra
note 7, at 146.
102. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Hall, supra note 100, at 8.
103. Balfour, supra note 6, at 796–97; Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 665;
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 768.
104. Colvin, supra note 38, at 193.
105. See Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory
of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY 623, 638–43 (2002) (arguing for reparations based on capacity of the
movement to maintain public memory and recognition of past and persisting wrongs).
106. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 390 (1987).
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Of course, their grousing will be far more muted than it might be if the
implied findings underlying nonmaterial awards implied a material
obligation. 107 However, the blame and shame entailed in nonmaterial
reparations still inspires resentment among those whose guilt is
presumed. 108 Further, any implied guilt preserves the sense of insecurity
among those associated with past wrongs that symbolically recognized
debts will one day be redeemed in material form. 109
Posttransitional preservation and extension of the oppositional logic110
underlying abuses may also be fed by victims’ resentment. Because
nonmaterial reparations necessarily are limited and often are perceived by
victims as incomplete, recipients inevitably will feel that they have not
been recognized and that their harms have not been fully compensated by
the very people who perpetrated abuses against them and their kin. 111
Perhaps out of this sense of inadequacy, former victims, their associates,
and their heirs, may perceive something less than full authenticity in
claims of regret advanced by those associated with past abuses when all
they are willing to provide as reparation are monuments, holidays, and
other purely “symbolic” measures.112
3. Individual Reparations
Objections to reparations programs that focus on individual former
victims vary according to the form of the program and its awards.
However, all individually awarded reparations are vulnerable to linedrawing problems. In an ideal world, transitions would be in a position to
order or provide reparations for all victims, whether they suffered direct or
indirect harm. However, transitions present a very imperfect world 113
107. These concerns led the Senate, in passing a resolution condemning and apologizing for
slavery and Jim Crow laws, to specifically disclaim any obligation to pay material reparations. See S.
Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009).
108. Balfour, supra note 6, at 790–95.
109. A similar concern motivated “Full Stop,” the termination of trials targeting leaders of the
Argentine juntas when middle- and lower-ranked military officials became fearful that they might
become targets for prosecution. See JAIME E. MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR
AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 63–67 (1996); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 71, 84–94
(1996).
110. See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 109, at 83–91; see also ELSTER, supra note 19, at 93.
111. See Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition
and Participation, in FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 7, 76–77.
112. Hall, supra note 100, at 8.
113. Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79
(1998); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 74–75 (1992).
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characterized by severe material limitations 114 made worse by the
reluctance of payers to sacrifice, often because they feel they are not
responsible. Any program that provides individual reparations will
therefore be faced with making choices about whom to compensate for
which harms and to what degree. 115 No matter the decisions made, they
will inspire objections from someone. Those compensated may object that
their compensation is incomplete. 116 Those not compensated will object
that their suffering has been denied by implication.117 Those asked to pay
will express concerns that the net has been cast too widely, including too
many beneficiaries. 118 Others may object that individual reparations come
at the expense of public projects with greater potential to advance
collective welfare,119 including the institution-building projects necessary
to prevent future abuses. 120
4. Group Reparations 121
While objections to group reparations come from all quarters, the
driving concern is one of scope.122 Reparations provided to a group as a
whole fail to distinguish among former victims, providing benefits to all
members without regard to the degree of harm suffered, 123 potentially even
benefitting some who did not suffer at all or who are themselves
implicated in abuses. 124 This indiscriminate approach to reparations raises
concerns for victims and payers alike. Affirmative action, 125 for example,
114. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2624–25.
115. Colvin, supra note 38, at 201–02; Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean
Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 51, 52–53 (2007).
116. Colvin, supra note 38, at 89–90.
117. Balfour, supra note 6, at 797.
118. Brophy, supra note 54, at 121.
119. Colvin, supra note 38, at 201–02.
120. Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 468 (1988).
121. For group-based reparations proposals see RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA
OWES BLACKS 244–47 (2000) (arguing for group-based reparations for contemporary black
Americans); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Right the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J.
2531, 2554 (2001).
122. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1189; Art Alcausin Hall, There Is A Lot to Be Repaired Before We
Get to Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of African
American Reparations, 2 SCHOLAR 1, 39 (2000); Kane, supra note 11, at 201.
123. Fortson, supra note 91, at 92–95.
124. Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress
and Where Awarding Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 610–11, 613–14
(2003); Miller, supra note 6, at 52.
125. Out of concern for some of the difficulties cited here, some scholars have argued that
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frequently is met with objections from critics on all sides that the access it
guarantees goes mainly to those who, by virtue of their social, economic,
and educational backgrounds, do not need the help and therefore take
opportunities from others who do. 126 In response to concerns of this sort,
Germany limited reparation payments to victims or their direct heirs. 127
Standing and privity represent another species of scope objection,
particularly in conversations about historical reparations. Standing and
privity are concepts core to stable state contract and tort law, and generally
limit obligations and claims of benefit to those who directly incurred a
duty, entitlement, or loss, or those who have a sufficiently close
relationship with an original claimant or obligor. 128 Standing plays a
spoiler role in reparations debates, challenging recipients to demonstrate
not only harm, but harm distinct from that suffered by the public at
large. 129 Privity also suggests that only those who suffered direct or
indirect harm may claim a right to reparation.130 Group reparations
frequently threaten this intuition by failing to distinguish between victims
and nonvictims. Privity is particularly relevant in the case of historical
claims, such as proposals for slavery reparations in the United States. In
this context, critics ask how “a claimant (or alleged victim) [can] establish
privity between himself (or his group) and the perpetrator when the latter
belongs to a different era” 131 and judges point out that “there is a fatal
disconnect between the [slaves] and the plaintiffs.” 132
Finally, group-based reparations must confront the twin concerns of
essentialism and perpetuating a culture of victimhood. 133 Paying
affirmative action should not be treated as a form of reparation. See Albert Mosely, Affirmative Action
as a Form of Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 353 (2003).
126. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 749 (suggesting that this objection can be met by
justifying group reparations in light of broader social justice goals).
127. See BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 12–81.
128. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 416 (2004) (“Ordinarily, the obligations arising out of a
contract are due only to those with whom it is made; a contract cannot be enforced by a person who is
not a party to it or in privity with it . . . .”); 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARTIES § 34 (2002) (“One cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private rights, or maintain a civil action for the
enforcement of such rights, unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real
interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D TORTS § 23 (2001) (“Traditionally, to authorize a recovery in tort,
privity must exist between the act of the wrongdoer and the injury complained of.”).
129. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1179–81.
130. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759–62 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Posner, J.).
131. Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 8; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at
723–27.
132. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d at 759.
133. ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL
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reparations to a group ignores differences among individuals in the
beneficiary group. 134 So doing risks reifying and perhaps providing
renewed legitimacy to the lines of opposition implicated in past abuses. 135
Perhaps more troubling is that beneficiaries may again and forever be
identified as victims, denying full autonomy to individuals and the
authority of identity creation to groups.136 For example, Justice Clarence
Thomas, among others, has argued that affirmative action should be
abandoned because it casts a shadow over the accomplishments of all
African Americans and marks blacks as victims, incapable of succeeding
on their individual merits.137
5. State Sponsored Reparations
The principal objections to state sponsoring of reparations programs
derive from the fact that funding comes from public coffers and therefore
implies guilt 138 and entails contributions from abusers, purported
innocents, and even victims who contribute to the public weal. 139 While
the decibel level of complaint goes down in cases of more symbolic
reparations, it seldom reaches zero because there is still a diversion of
public resources, whether as money, time, or attention, that might
otherwise be directed to other public projects. 140
There are also a number of theoretical and practical concerns relating to
state-sponsored reparations that frequently are overlooked. For example,
when a state pays reparations it assumes the mantle of justice provider,
which may obscure the role of the state in past abuses. 141 For those deeply
RIGHTS AMERICA (1998); Alfred Brody, The Culture War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1181, 1201, 1209–10 (2004); Tracinski, supra note 7, at 149.
134. Balfour, supra note 6, at 790–95.
135. Id.; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 767.
136. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 768.
137. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 402 n.3 (1987).
138. Stacy Elmer, Health Disparities And Historical Injustice In Sierra Leone: A Case For
Reparations?, 57 U. KANSAS L. REV. 971, 988 (2009); McCarthy, supra note 6 at 757.
139. DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY
12–13 (2002); Brody, supra note 133, at 1203; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–16; McCarthy,
supra note 6, at 755; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 152 (advancing the facially specious argument that the
United States government cannot be asked to pay reparations for slavery because North and South both
expended blood and treasure in a Civil War to end slavery); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:
An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 652–54 (1993).
140. See Gibson, supra note 9 (quoting Virginia Del. Hargrove for opposition to a proposed
resolution to apologize for slavery in part on grounds that focusing on the past is “counterproductive”).
141. Balfour, supra note 6, at 796.
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skeptical of state power, particularly in light of past abuses, putting the
state at the center of reparations programs may expand state power by
perpetuating a subservient relationship between the state and its
subjects. 142 That continued domination is both physical (victims remain
dependent upon the state for justice and for material support) and more
metaphysical—defining former victims as dependants while potentially
cleansing the state of its role as a moving force behind past atrocities. 143
Making the state the primary payer of reparations also puts it in the role
of final arbiter of who the real victims are, picking winners and losers in
contests among former victims over limited resources. 144 That selection
process pits victim groups against one another, fragmenting populations
that might ordinarily form coalitions along aligned interests. Lawrie
Balfour has suggested that this potential was in full relief in the movement
for Japanese reparations in the United States where advocates made their
case for compensating victims of internment during World War II by
contrasting Japanese Americans with African Americans to suggest that
the former were intrinsically more deserving than the latter. 145
Finally, and from a more practical point of view, some public choice
theorists have argued that, as the final arbiter of normative change,
governments may be less likely to support or allow social shifts away from
abusive practices if the state is required to pay retroactive reparations. 146
The insight is simple: in an environment of rapid social change, if the
entity negatively affected by the shift has the capacity to stop or delay
change, then it will be more likely to do so if that strategy will best serve
its interests. If a state will be called upon to pay reparations posttransition,
then that serves as motivation to delay, stop, or constrain transitional
movements and reforms. 147
142. Id.
143. Id. at 796–97; see also Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State,
the Individual, and Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605 (2005) (discussing how Austria constructed a
postwar narrative denying state complicity in Nazi crimes).
144. Balfour, supra note 6, at 797.
145. Id.
146. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1687–88.
147. Id. at 1687. Levmore’s concern certainly has some anecdotal support. For example, victims
of internment in the United States during World War II and of the Argentine juntas waited decades for
reparation.
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6. Group Sponsored Reparations
Reparations funded by contributions from the group or groups
associated with past abuses may cast a smaller net but are still vulnerable
to protests by group members who claim innocence. 148 Those objections
are twofold. First, those who regard themselves as innocent may object to
making contributions meant to compensate harms caused by others. 149
Second, they may object to the implication, by association, that they are
themselves guilty. 150 As opposed to state-sponsored reparations, then,
programs that attempt to tap a narrower group may actually meet with
louder objection by those who regard themselves as innocent because the
targeting carries with it an implication of blame that is absent when the
contributions come from state accounts. That implication of guilt may also
meet with objections even from those who were perpetrators, for the
reasons set forth in Part II.B.8.
7. Individually Funded Reparations
Reparations paid by individuals meet a host of justification challenges
depending on who the individuals are and how they fit in the matrix of
past wrongs. These are elaborated below, but foremost among them are
objections relating to selectivity and line drawing. Those actually
implicated in past abuses cannot object based on innocence or lack of
responsibility, but may express concerns based on the fact that they only
did what the law allowed or required and that it would be unfair or unjust
to hold them solely or individually to account. 151 Of course, individuals
not implicated will object to their being made to bear the burdens of
compensating for harms caused by others. 152 Claims based on unjust
enrichment may quell the implications of wrongdoing153 but must
themselves face objections sounding in innocent title.154 Finally, no matter
their relation to past abuses, individuals asked to carry the full weight of
responsibility for harms perpetrated in the name of a collective enterprise
148. Brody, supra note 133, at 1201 (quoting David Horowitz); Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188;
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–16; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 153.
149. Miller, supra note 6, at 52–53.
150. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 716.
151. Id. at 711; Hylton, supra note 92, at 1222; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at
691.
152. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188–90.
153. Fortson, supra note 91, at 124.
154. Sebok, supra note 85, at 655. But see Harris, supra note 79, at 1773–74, 1778–79.
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supported by a predecessor regime, its laws, and its institutions are bound
to demand that responsibility be distributed more widely. 155
8. Reparations Funded by Perpetrators
Reparations paid solely by those implicated in past abuses solve the
scope problems suffered by more general funding models but, by virtue of
that focus, entail discriminate blame of a kind with assignments of
criminal or tort liability. That leads to objections born of legality, similar
to those raised against criminal prosecutions in transitions. 156 Those asked
to pay protest that they should not be held legally liable because the
prevailing law under the abusive regime sanctioned, or at least did not
punish, their conduct. Legality concerns lead, in turn, to further concerns
about line drawing that require determining which levels of involvement
or blame are sufficient to trigger duties of contribution and which are
not. 157 No matter where those lines are drawn, they will meet with
resentment for at least two reasons. First, these selections, by virtue of
their selectivity, will face objections of over and under inclusiveness as to
who suffered and as to who is responsible. Second, those finally
determined to owe duties of repair inevitably will protest that they have
been made to carry the water for atrocities that were a function of broader
social realities, including an abusive regime, its institutions, and its laws.
That protest implicates again concerns with emphasizing group-based
oppositions at the center of past wrongs. 158 This reification of social lines
of inclusion and exclusion runs the danger of entrenching rather than
diffusing social tensions, what Lawrie Balfour, Susan Bickford, and
Wendy Brown describe as “ressentiment.” 159
9. Reparations Funded by Those Associated with Atrocities
For those actually implicated in past wrongs, none of these linedrawing concerns are resolved by the addition to the pool of payers
associated but not actually implicated in abuses. Moreover, those captured
155. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 723.
156. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2638–42; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 711.
157. I address these concerns in the context of criminal trials in Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra
note 16.
158. Brody, supra note 133, at 1201 (quoting David Horowitz); Epstein, supra note 99, at 1187–
88; Kane, supra note 11, at 199; Levmore, supra note 66, at 1689; Loury, supra note 99, at 158;
Miller, supra note 6, at 46–47; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146, 156–57.
159. Balfour, supra note 6, at 788.
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by the widened net will repeat now familiar objections. Those merely
associated with past abuses who are asked to contribute to reparations
programs will object that they are not those most responsible and that lines
of obligation should be drawn more narrowly, excluding them, or more
broadly, including others. Legality concerns, while not completely salient,
only add fuel to these fires of resentment, 160 and, again, resentment raises
the risk of reinvigorating lines of social opposition implicated in past
abuses.
10.

Reparations Paid by those Not Implicated in Past Abuses

Line-drawing concerns reach their apex in cases where those not
implicated in past abuses are asked to pay reparations to victims. 161 While
acute in cases of state-sponsored reparations, “It wasn’t me” objections are
far more powerful where someone not implicated is asked to pay for the
wrong of another even if the wrongdoer is also made to pay. 162 The source
of that objection is so ubiquitous that it can make a plausible claim to
Truth, or at least to being fundamental to the human condition. Manuel G.
Velasquez puts it as elegantly as anyone, pointing out that:
[N]either blame nor punishment are appropriate (i.e., morally
justified) when a person is not morally responsible for an act in the
sense . . . . [that] if an act is not the (causal or conventional) result
of my own, direct bodily movements (or omissions) or if it is not an
intentional consequence of these movements, then it is not
appropriate to blame or punish me for the act. 163
That a request might be only for a partial contribution may mute some of
the outrage but certainly does not moot objections from those not
implicated in past abuses that they simply are not to blame and should not
be forced to pay for harms caused by another.
11.

Persistent Themes

Several themes emerge from this brief overview. Two deserve
particular attention. First, whether reparations are symbolic or material,
there are problems with distribution and fit. Reparations programs may
160. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 707.
161. Id. at 715–16.
162. See Scalia, supra note 9, at 88.
163. Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They
Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 111, 115 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991).
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benefit too many or too few, providing benefits that some will find
insufficient and others will deem excessive. Second, reparations programs
will face vigorous opposition if contributions are drawn from those who
claim that they did not do anything wrong. 164 This second concern is
particularly acute in circumstances of historical abuses, where the original
abusers are long dead. 165 “It wasn’t me” objections are not limited to this
circumstance, however, and even if a reparations program seeks funds
only from those implicated in past abuses, payers will challenge their
liability on the grounds that they only did what was expected of them, or at
least did not violate then-existing law. 166
Both of these themes and their variations get traction from problems of
desert, which bespeaks what Pablo De Greiff has called a juridical bias 167
and treats reparations as special tort awards. On the juridical view,
reparations seek to compensate for harm measured historically, as status
quo ante 168 or, counterfactually, 169 as utinam aliter esset. 170 This tort
model implicates basic moral considerations and fundamental notions of
fairness 171 that, in turn, give substance to the most common objections to
reparations programs. “It wasn’t me” is only relevant in light of
background commitments that one should not be held to account for harm
caused by another and one should not be blamed for doing what, at the
time, seemed right under the law. 172 Reparation payments are only
164. Brody, supra note 133, at 1202–06; Brophy, supra note 54, at 121; Posner & Vermeule,
Reparations, supra note 6, at 703–04; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 151–55. There are many other
objections that can be made. For example, both victims and contributors might object if the class of
beneficiaries includes nonvictims or if the nature and degree of benefits does not reflect variations in
abuses and harms suffered. For present, however, I will limit myself to two of what I take to be the
most significant objections, noting that the theory developed in the process will provide grounds for
responding to many other challenges to reparations programs.
165. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757.
166. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 711; Hylton, supra note 92, at 1222; Posner & Vermeule,
Reparations, supra note 6, at 691 (noting that reparations are typically provided “on the basis of
wrongs that were substantively permissible under the prevailing law when committed”).
167. De Greiff, supra note 30, at 451–53; see also McEvoy, supra note 17, at 16.
168. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 94, at 844. While not central to the present analysis, it is worth
noting that any measure of harm based on status quo ante assumes a historical moment of justice that
can serve as a point of comparison. In many abusive regimes there is no such moment. See De Greiff,
supra note 30, at 457; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff supra note 54, at 325.
169. Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Harris, supra note 79; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755.
170. I owe this translation to Professor Andrew Miller by way of our student Katie O’Malley, who
recommended it to capture the concept of the world as it would have been now had the past event not
occurred, a sighing comparative measure related to, but distinct from, the more familiar status quo
ante. See Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 691; RohtArriaza, supra note 35, at 158.
171. See Brophy, supra note 54, at 135–36 (advocating for a reparations model focusing on
assignments of moral culpability).
172. Brody, supra note 133, at 1202.
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inadequate if tied to some claim of harm. Line-drawing problems with
respect to beneficiaries only matter if there is some sense that only those
who suffered harm ought to receive compensation and only to the degree
or extent of their suffering.
These intuitions are born of an “ethical individualism” 173 that is
foundational to most tort and criminal law,174 not to mention the rule of
law itself. 175 However, they are relevant in the present context only insofar
as reparations are viewed retrospectively and as compensation for harm.
That retrospectivity and focus on harm forms the core of the juridical bias.
That bias reflects a presumption that transitional justice is just a special
case of ordinary justice 176 and reparations in the transitional justice context
just a special kind of tort award susceptible to constraints familiar from
criminal law and tort. This Article argues that this bias is misplaced.
Transitional justice is not just a special case of ordinary justice. Therefore,
no matter how laudable the moral intuitions of ethical individualism may
be, they provide no grounds for objecting to well structured and properly
conceived reparations programs deployed as part of a broader program of
transitional justice. Part IV charts that course. Before getting there,
however, it is worth taking a few moments to consider some of the
alternative approaches proposed in the literature.
III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES
“Responsibility” is a notoriously elusive concept, a fact H.L.A. Hart
captured in a delightful exercise of ambiguation:
As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every
night and was responsible for the loss of the ship with all aboard. It
was rumored that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he
was responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved
quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that
he was not a responsible person. He always maintained that the
exceptional winter storms were responsible for the loss of the ship,
173. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 703; see also McCarthy, supra note 6, at
759.
174. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 246 (1952).
175. Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146 (asserting that one of the “basic moral principles at the
foundation of American law” is “that justice is individual”).
176. See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Ordinary Justice].
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but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found
criminally responsible for his negligent conduct, and in separate
civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for the loss of life
and property. He is still alive and he is morally responsible for the
deaths of many women and children. 177
Some of the distinctions Hart suggests are quite fine.178 “Responsibility”
may mean an obligation to compensate for harm because one’s actions
were culpable, because those actions caused the harm, or simply because
one has assumed a duty of repair. 179 In addition to purely retrospective
responsibility for past harms, “responsibility” may attach to a condition of
character or practice, what Manuel G. Velasquez has called
responsibility’s “aretaic” sense. 180 “Responsibility” may also be more
prospective, as in “the captain is responsible for the safety of his
passengers and crew.”
Any claim for reparations must rest on some theory of responsibility.
As the preceding section revealed, much of the debate about reparations
assumes that the sense of responsibility germane to transitional justice is
akin to ordinary justice claims in tort or criminal law. This assumption
leads most reparations claims into an argumentative or political dead end
and raises serious practical difficulties. In the remainder of Part III, this
Article examines some of the most prevalent efforts to avoid this cul-desac and describes how each is insufficient to the meet the unique demands
of justice in transition. Part IV capitalizes on this discussion to sketch a
more descriptively appealing and normatively powerful account of
reparations based on a conception of responsibility tailored to transition.
A. Collective Responsibility
“[M]embership in a collective entity brings with it certain benefits
and costs, rights and obligations, as incidents of membership. A
principal reason for forming and joining a collective group is to gain
certain advantages not available to disassociated individuals. The
consideration for such advantages gained from group membership is
177. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 211 (1962).
178. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship 49–53 (1984).
179. Velasquez, supra note 163, at 112.
180. Id. “Aretaic” has ancient roots in Plato and particularly Aristotle, whose work on
eudaimonism provides the foundation for contemporary virtue ethics propounded by, among others,
G.E.M. Anscombe, Phillipa Foot, Martha Nussbaum, Linda Zagzebski, Lawrence Solum, and Richard
Kraut.
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that burdens incurred or experienced by the collective group may
fairly be shared by the entire membership. A member cannot fairly
claim the right to retain membership in the collective entity,
including any benefits flowing therefrom, while denying any share
in the burdens of membership.”
—Kim Forde-Mazrui 181
In the face of objections borne of ethical individualism, some
reparations proponents turn to theories of collective responsibility. 182 The
insight is fairly straightforward. There is no contest that horrific wrongs
occurred under an abusive regime. Those acts were widespread,
implicating thousands of individuals and diffusing responsibility. Abuses
also were institutionalized, and approved or supported by a background set
of legal and social norms. If those facts make it either unfair or unrealistic
to identify and hold responsible a discrete set of individuals, then for those
same reasons it makes sense to hold responsible the group as a whole.183 If
a group pursued abuses through state institutions, then it likewise makes
sense to hold the state liable for resulting harms. 184
Shifting from individual to collective responsibility has a number of
salutary effects. First, it limits claims for reparation to the group or the
state, thereby avoiding most line-drawing problems. Second, because no
individuals are held personally liable, defenses based on ethical
individualism appear to melt away. Those advantages are particularly
evident where the claim for reparation is based on unjust enrichment. 185 In
general, unjust enrichment claims focus on redistribution of resources
rather than blame, 186 rendering irrelevant assertions of personal
innocence. 187 Measuring unjust enrichment on a group, rather than
181. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 717–18.
182. See, e.g., JASPERS, supra note 15, at 25; Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries
of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992); George Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–26;
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 133 (Larry
May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); Heinrich Gomperz, Individual, Collective and Social
Responsibility, 49 ETHICS 329, 333 (1939); McCarthy, supra note 6, at 756–58; Miller, supra note 6,
at 72–73; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–28.
183. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 276.
184. See McCarthy, supra note 6, at 762; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 215–16.
185. See, e.g., Bernard Boxill, Morality of Reparation, 2 J. SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 113, 120
(1972); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational
Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (2004); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 694–
710; see also Fortson, supra note 91, at 80.
186. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 284.
187. Fortson, supra note 91, at 111–15, 123–24.
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individual, basis makes matters even more comfortable for individuals
since nobody’s personal property or wealth is singled out as being the
product of atrocity.
For example, in a recent article on domestic claims for material
reparations, Kim Forde-Mazrui contends that slavery and subsequent
practices of racial discrimination implicate American society at large. 188
Contesting popular conceptions that intense racial discrimination is limited
to Southern states, she contends that current disparities in achievement
between whites and blacks are “not surprising,” 189 but are bound to a set of
racist practices to which American society at large subscribed and from
which the nation as a whole has profited.190 Signaling basic agreement, the
United States Senate recently found that “African-Americans continue to
suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws.” 191 Evidence
supporting that view is striking. As Randall Robinson has pointed out,
while black Americans account for only fourteen percent of nonviolent
drug crime, they represent seventy-five percent of prison admissions for
nonviolent drug crime. 192 Thomas McCarthy recounts the history of
housing law and practice in the United States, describing how segregation,
redlining, and exclusion from historic federal housing programs has
resulted in a tremendous wealth gap in the United States along racial
lines. 193 Relying on “corrective justice,” Professor Forde-Mazrui
concludes that since all of America engaged in racial discrimination from
its inception, all of America is responsible for contemporary harms caused
by that discrimination.194 Thus, “[e]ach American child born today into a
life worse off than it would be had society not practiced slavery,
segregation, and other discrimination, or had society adequately remedied
their effects, is a new individual victim of societal discrimination” entitled
to redress based on that counterfactually measured harm. 195
Ryan Fortson takes a different, but related, tack, relying on Cheryl
Harris’s groundbreaking work on the property value of racial identity. 196
Fortson argues that contemporary material disparities between groups
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 698, 716–20.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 694–710; see also Fortson, supra note 91, at 80.
S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009).
Robinson, supra note 97, at 2.
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 708–09.
Id. at 708–09; see also Harris, supra note 79, at 1784.
Harris, supra note 79, at 1784; see also Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 280.
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reflect a property interest enjoyed by the dominant or oppressive group.197
On his view, as on Forde-Mazuri’s, that property interest is best addressed
by group-level redistribution of material and opportunity resources. 198
This associational view of collective responsibility is echoed in the
literature on moral taint.199 Moral taint relies on linking the pride one often
feels for accomplishments of a group or its members to the shame one
ought to feel for harms caused by a group or associates. 200 This taint is
independent of any causal connection to harm. So, moral taint theorists
conclude, one can feel shame for the crimes of a child, sibling, or friend
even if one has no knowledge of or connection to those acts. 201
A more sophisticated view of collective responsibility that bears some
resemblance to moral taint relies on the existential fact of membership.
For example, Amy Sepinwall argues that groups exist only by virtue of the
voluntary association of their members. 202 To persist over time, groups
must recruit new members. All groups have a history, some good, some
bad, and that history implies both benefits and burdens. From this,
Sepinwall argues, it follows that present-day members of a group bear
responsibility for duties of repair owed by the group because it is their
very membership in the group that allows it to exist and persist.203
The application of collective responsibility and moral taint to claims
for reparation is obvious. To the extent those asked to pay are identified, at
least in part, according to membership in a group whose members
perpetrated atrocities, those payers are tainted and should contribute to
reparations in order to recognize and cleanse that taint. 204 However, there
are a number of difficulties with resting reparations claims on grounds of
collective responsibility, many of which derive from the ethical
individualism group liability hopes to avoid.
To start, reparations claims that rely on contemporary disparities in
achievement or wealth still bear a burden of showing a causal connection
to the history of abuse. That may be a difficult task, particularly in cases
197. Fortson, supra note 91, at 111–15.
198. Id. at 111, 114–27.
199. See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 25, at 113; OSHANA, supra note 25, at 76; Appiah, supra note 25,
at 185; May, supra note 25, at 151 (1992); Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 216–28.
200. See JASPERS, supra note 15, at 73; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 717–18; H. D. Lewis,
Collective Responsibility (A Critique), in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 17, 19–21 (Larry May &
Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991).
201. David Kaczynski cited moral taint as his motivation for turning in his brother Ted, the famed
“Unabomber,” to authorities. OSHANA, supra note 25, at 72.
202. Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–05.
203. Id. at 191, 205–08.
204. OSHANA, supra note 25, at 76.
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where reparations claims are based on historical wrongs. The offer of
proof is usually statistics documenting disparities in wealth, achievement,
or opportunity, and the verdict depends on inferring a causal
connection. 205 However, correlation does not entail causation. 206 That
fallacy presents a particular danger to material reparations programs,
including affirmative action, because awards made to groups and
institutions necessarily devolve upon individuals. As Judge Posner put the
point in In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., “[t]here is no
way to determine that a given black American today is worse off by a
specific, [calculable] sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a
result of the conduct of one or more of the defendants.” 207
This is yet another instance of the by now familiar objection that
reparations ought not to benefit those who have not suffered harm and
certainly should not go to those whose hands are not clean. 208 As Judge
Posner suggests, reparations claims implicate a potential beneficiary’s
personal history. In the case of historical wrongs, that history may involve
so many variables that it becomes impossible to disentangle the impact of
personal decisions, talents, and ambitions from external constraints
imposed by an abusive regime. That leaves reparations programs
vulnerable to arguments that any potential beneficiary’s contemporary
material conditions are the consequence of mistakes and failures of his or
her forebears. 209 In this context, the successes of some members of a
targeted group during the history of an abusive regime may be used to
argue that a potential beneficiary’s situation is not a result of social
injustice at all, but a personal failure on his part or that of his forebears.
Just as group reparations devolve upon individuals, collective duties to
fund reparations ultimately fall on individual members, even if only in the
form of taxes. This again implicates complicated personal narratives,
particularly in the case of historic wrongs where disparities in wealth
provide primary evidence of abuses. Some potential contributors will
argue that their personal success is consequent of hard work, not injustice.
Alternatively, members of the payer group may acknowledge that their
205. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64;
Robinson, supra note 97, at 2; see generally Sebok, supra note 85.
206. See Bruce Sacerdote, Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital
(Sept. 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~bsacerdo/wpapers/
Slavery3.pdf) (arguing that the economic effects of slavery dissipated several generations ago).
207. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner,
J.).
208. See Laplante, supra note 115, at 52–53.
209. See, e.g., Tracinski, supra note 7.
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wealth is in part a function of historical wrongs but maintain that for them
this is a matter of moral luck, 210 providing ground to argue that they are
not “responsible” for duties of repair because they are not to blame.
Setting aside blame in favor of claims based on unjust enrichment are
unlikely to move the conversation very far in light of the common law bar
of innocent title. 211
Collective responsibility advocates confronted with these responses
inevitably cry foul, pointing out that these critiques revert to the normative
vocabulary of ethical individualism and therefore constitute a non
sequitur. 212 However, it is not at all clear that this is responsive. What
these practical objections reveal is a conceptual error at the core of
collective responsibility: groups do not act, only individuals act. 213 While
internal decision structures may allow individuals to commit structured
groups to courses of action, 214 those decisions are made by individuals and
those initiatives can only be carried out by individuals. That simple fact
has two consequences.
First, because a collectivity cannot act, it frequently is the case that the
conduct of individuals cannot rightly be attributed to the whole. At the
very least, making that case will require demonstrating that the actions of
those individuals were directed or condoned according to the rules of
internal decision making that governs the group. 215 That may be easy for
corporations, but it becomes much more difficult for states and impossible
for ethnic or religious groups. 216 Therefore, collective responsibility and
moral taint are simply too blunt to serve as tools for distributing duties of
repair that will be borne by individuals directly or derivatively. After all,
literal application will capture for equal blame, by virtue of ethnicity or
other group affiliation, full-fledged abusers, those who simply did not
know what was afoot, and those who battled heroically, perhaps at great
personal peril, to prevent or limit the impact of abuses perpetrated by
others.
Second, the fact that there often is diversity in the relationships
between individual members of a group and abuses purportedly committed
210. On the question of moral luck, see Williams & Nagel, supra note 3. I am in debt to my
student Adam Sharpe for our exchanges on this point.
211. Sebok, supra note 85, at 655.
212. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 84–91; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 724–25.
213. See JASPERS, supra note 15, at 33–36; Lewis, supra note 200, at 20; Velasquez, supra note
163, at 124.
214. See, e.g., French, supra note 182.
215. Id. at 133.
216. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 33–36.
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in the name of that group reveals a devolution problem at the core of
collective responsibility. Put succinctly, just because the conduct of some
individuals is attributed to a corporation or group does not mean that the
consequences as duties of repair can rightly fall upon all members, many
of whom may be innocent. Advocates might respond that such disparities
are of no consequence in light of failures by the group and its individual
members to protect oppressed populations 217 or the fact that they have
allowed the group to persist. 218 However, that requires reliance on a theory
of liability by omission, which is no small feat, and further ignores the fact
that some group members may in fact have been moral heroes who fought
against policies of slavery, segregation, or torture but simply failed to stop
abuses.
The conceptual difficulties with collective responsibility are not limited
to actus reus. To make a claim of group liability requires some theory of
mens rea as well. Again advocates must confront the fact that groups can
only act through individuals. This presents one of two options. First,
collective responsibility advocates can assume that each agent’s acts
reflect his individual mental state. However, to do so would be to revert to
individual responsibility, opening the door to objections based on ethical
individualism that theories of collective responsibility seek to avoid.
Alternatively, advocates can embrace some theory of collective
consciousness exercised through agents akin to the way that our individual
intentions are exercised through our hands. This view is hard to square
with subjective experience and closely held commitments to free will. 219
Even were one to accept such a notion, however, it appears that any
collective consciousness engaged in targeted atrocities has a ready defense
of mistake. 220
Atrocities on a scale warranting transitional justice rely on a belief that
victims are rightly the objects of abuse, sometimes as a matter of
convenience, but more often because victims are regarded as less than
human 221 or as posing an imminent threat. 222 To hold a group responsible
for abuses perpetrated under the influence of such false beliefs requires
holding that group liable for the beliefs themselves. That, in turn, requires
identifying a moment in the historical genesis of those beliefs when it can
217. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 722.
218. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 213–15.
219. See generally Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, supra note 3.
220. I am in debt to Ronald Dworkin for conversations and exchanges on this point.
221. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 623, 632–33 (noting “scientific” rationalizations for slavery and
anti-Semitism).
222. See Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–42; infra Part IV.A.
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rightly be said that the group as a whole acted willfully, knowingly, or at
least recklessly in allowing itself to pursue an epistemic path to
atrocities. 223 That is a hard story to tell. Moreover, it entails a regress that,
even if not infinite, is bound to extend to a time long before contemporary
constituents of the group were around. This puts collective responsibility
advocates on the hook for not just a theory of collective consciousness, but
also for a theory of group identity over time sufficiently robust to capture
as one hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals separated by
space, time, and experience.
Among others, Amy Sepinwall and Thomas McCarthy offer a potential
response. 224 Assuming as an abstract matter that groups can maintain
continuous identity over time, 225 these scholars argue that those who
associate themselves with a group and claim the benefits of membership
must also assume the burdens of that association, including responsibility
for past wrongs. 226 This view certainly has some footing in corporate law,
where companies routinely are held liable for the conduct of predecessor
entities. 227 However, this approach to collective responsibility fails to
appreciate the nature of transitions, fails to address critical questions about
the terms of membership in the relevant group, and endorses an account of
historical-group responsibility that is far too dangerous to garner support
in the context of transitional justice debates.
First, transitional regimes are defined in opposition to the very conduct
of their predecessors that gives rise to reparations claims. 228 Therefore, it
is not at all clear that a theory of group identity over time would apply in
transitions. 229
Second, the most common targets for collective responsibility are
states, racial groups, or ethnic groups.230 For most members of these
groups, membership is a matter of birth. As a consequence, there is no
moment of voluntary association upon which advocates can rest claims of
223. See generally Rosen, supra note 3.
224. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 717–18; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757–58;
Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 205–09.
225. Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–03.
226. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757–58; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 205–09.
227. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981) (“[W]here one
corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if
exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling
corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the
same product line . . . .”).
228. RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28–33 (2002).
229. For an argument in favor of holding successor regimes liable for the debts incurred by their
forbears, see Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 147–57.
230. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 209.
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responsibility for the group. Reversion to implied consent is of little
assistance in light of the fact that exiting one’s racial or ethnic identity is
impossible and exiting one’s state of birth practically so. 231
Third, and most troubling, is that the associational view of group
responsibility seems to endorse group consciousness and a brand of group
responsibility that is heavily implicated in atrocities. The Balkans provide
the most ready example, 232 but many atrocities are driven at least in part
by a sense of duty held by members of one group to seek justice for
historical offenses. 233 Therefore, unless one is willing to endorse the
theory behind intergenerational blood feuds, reserving criticism only for
methods, it is hard to endorse collective responsibility as a ground for
reparations.
A moment’s reflection on the foregoing discussion reveals that the real
problem with reparations claims based on theories of collective
responsibility is that they run aground on the same shoals upon which
individually oriented theories founder. Most objections to reparations
programs rest on the presumption that reparations claims are meant to
compensate for past harms. 234 Reparations theories that appeal to
collective responsibility confront similar or identical objections because
they embrace, rather than examine, this retrospective bias and commitment
that reparations are a form of compensation for harm. These conceptual
choices make inevitable the practical objections set forth here. Those
objections can only be avoided if reparations advocates take seriously the
source and nature of pretransitional abuses and the liminal position of
reparations in the context of a broader effort to achieve justice in
transition.
B. Atonement
Some reparations advocates recognize the dangers of applying
compensatory frameworks familiar from ordinary justice to transitional
circumstances. For many of the reasons discussed above, these theorists
231. For a useful overview of the debate, see Linda Barclay, Liberalism and Diversity, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 155 (Jackson & Smith eds., 2005).
232. Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111,
112–15 (Shute & Hurley eds., 1993).
233. DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE
HOLOCAUST 27–163, 416–54 (1996); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 47–62, 96–131
(1998); MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 10–11.
234. See infra Part II.B.
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conclude that retrospective tort models “undermine [social] harmony and
reconciliation,” “result in an insufficient development of the historical
record,” and suffer a “moral deficiency” by mistaking compensation for
acceptance of responsibility. 235 As an alternative to retrospective
compensation, some of these critics argue for a model of reparation as
atonement and redress. As described by one of its most sophisticated
advocates, the “atonement model is crafted from th[e] post-Holocaust
spirit of heightened morality, identity between victim and perpetrator,
egalitarianism, and restorative justice.” 236
Atonement theories are entirely prospective 237 and focus on achieving
reconciliation between former abusers and victims. 238 The core of the
model is a substantial apology composed of “(1) confess[ion] of the deed,
(2) admi[ssion] that the deed constitutes an atrocity, (3) repent[ance], and
(4) ask[ing] for forgiveness.” 239 So conceived, symbolic reparations are
not merely hollow efforts to fill compensation gaps; rather, they reflect
“remorse,” the “taking [of] personal responsibility,” and a sincere effort at
reconciliation.240 As opposed to ordinary justice approaches, atonement
regards material reparations not as compensation for harms suffered, but
as a “tangible . . . redemptive act . . . [that makes] the apology
believable” 241; reparations are not “punishment for guilt, but rather, [they
are] an acknowledgement of guilt.” 242
The instinct to turn away from ordinary justice models of retrospective
compensation in favor of a more prospective focus on transitional goals of
social healing and reconciliation is laudable. Unfortunately, putting the
weight of reparation programs on apology and forgiveness commits
advocates to conceptual constraints that render the entire approach
practically naïve and potentially oppressive. These difficulties become
apparent upon closer investigation of the internal dynamics of atonement.
235. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 65 (2004); see also Anthony J. Sebok, Two
Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1424–27 (2004).
236. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 66.
237. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 255.
238. See, e.g., BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 6–7; Brooks, PerpetratorFocused, supra note 11, at 63; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 254, 273–79; Miller, supra note
6, at 71–79; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35, at 159; Lewis Beale, Seeking Justice for Slavery’s Sins, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at 1 (quoting Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, plaintiff in In re African-American
Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006)).
239. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67.
240. Id. at 67; see also Sebok, supra note 235, at 1424–27.
241. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67.
242. Id.
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The acceptance of responsibility at the heart of the atonement model is
akin to what Karl Jaspers has called “moral guilt” in that it is internal and
can only be assessed internally. 243 That is, as compared to criminal guilt,
which is determined and imposed externally regardless of the criminal’s
acceptance of responsibility, 244 the moral guilt that gives rise to apology is
wholly a function of subjective acceptance of responsibility. Apologies
therefore cannot be demanded. By definition, they must be internally
generated, spontaneous, and reflect a genuine acceptance of
responsibility. 245 The internal genesis of apology is crucial to atonement
theory and marks the distinction for advocates between punishment and
acceptance of guilt.246 The atonement approach therefore avoids “It wasn’t
me” objections born of ethical individualism by persuading those asked to
pay or support reparations that, in fact, it was them. 247 Advocates further
contend that this brand of spontaneous and genuine apology provides a
more promising basis for social reconciliation, healing, and reconstruction
than tort-based models. 248
However attractive atonement and apology may be in the abstract, this
approach to reparations raises daunting practical concerns. Principally,
because apology and atonement are tied to spontaneous subjective mental,
ethical, and moral states,249 there can be no procedural guarantees of
success. No matter how comprehensive a truth commission or other
process might be, it may reach its conclusion and still find a recalcitrant
abuser who clings to the fiction of his innocence, is steadfast in his belief
of entitlement in past abuses or present enrichment, or for any other reason
declines or refuses to apologize and pay material reparations. Ironically,
then, atonement advocates ultimately seem to assume or endorse, rather
than avoid, basic principles of ethical individualism. As a consequence,
when faced with a contumacious abuser, any model that depends upon
apology for its success has no way to proceed. Any enforcement
243. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 25–26.
244. Id. at 25.
245. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 64; see also Jean Hampton, Correcting
Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677 (1992).
246. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67.
247. See, e.g., Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 66–67; Matsuda, supra note 106, at
390; see also Hampton, supra note 245, at 1677.
248. See STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 191 (noting that “to forgive is to accept the repudiation and
to forswear the resentment [of a wrong done]”); Fortson, supra note 91, at 123; Richard Weisman,
Showing Remorse at the TRC: Towards a Constitutive Approach to Reparative Discourse, 24
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 221 (2006).
249. STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 191; Hampton, supra note 245, at 1677.
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mechanism, whether carrot or stick, taints the apology and renders it
insufficient to the task of atonement. 250
Whether viewed in the abstract or through the lens of history, the
practical likelihood that abusers will refuse to apologize is quite high,
suggesting that sincere apology is and will be the exception rather than the
rule. 251 Foremost among these concerns is the obvious psychological stake
that former abusers have in avoiding acceptance of responsibility.
Atonement requires that former abusers acknowledge and accept
responsibility for horrific acts of violence. Given how hard it is for most
people to truly accept responsibility for minor offenses and sexual
dalliances, it is hard to imagine that perpetrators of murder, rape, torture,
and genocide will be ready and willing to confront their past acts with
sufficient depth and honesty to offer the kind of apology atonement
requires. Such apologies are certainly the exception in the case of stable
state crimes, not the rule. Even where guilt is admitted, offenders routinely
seek refuge from full accountability in their upbringing or their social and
economic circumstances.252 Participants in mass atrocities have a more
persuasive case on this score than most. Whether true believers, followers,
or abettors, participants in mass atrocities act within background social
norms and black letter law that presents targeted violence as right,
necessary, or at least not illegal.253 That fact provides a ready and
psychologically appealing option to full and honest apology: blaming the
system. That remains a common defense in the United States for those
who owned slaves, 254 participated in Jim Crow laws, and it is even
advanced as an excuse for those who participated in lynching. 255
The natural psychological resistance to admitting participation in
unfathomable evil is only stronger when coupled with the prospect of
material loss. Central to the case for atonement is the necessity that
apology be made manifest in the form of material reparation.256 The
250. Roy Brooks, for one, admits this limitation. See Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11,
at 67.
251. For example, some of the most high-profile perpetrators of abuses during Apartheid refused
to participate in the South African Truth and Reconciliation process. See ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY
UNMASKED, 216–20, 257, 303–05 (2000).
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (allowing judges to consider a defendant’s background in
sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
253. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–36 (arguing that, while an excuse based on
background norms has no moral validity, it does have legal weight under the principle of legality in the
form of a duty of fair warning).
254. See David Lowenthal, Thomas Ruffin And The Perils Of Public Homage: On Arraigning
Ancestors: A Critique Of Historical Contrition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935 (2009).
255. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 64–66.
256. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67.
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sacrifice entailed by material reparations stands as a significant barrier to
apology. For example, passage of the 2009 resolution apologizing for
slavery by the United States Senate was only possible when sponsors
added language disclaiming any obligation to pay material reparations. 257
Fears of material sacrifice also played an important role in South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which famously offered amnesty
from criminal and civil liability in exchange for public admission of
participation in Apartheid abuses.258 It is hard to take too seriously an
apology given in exchange for protection from material or personal loss.
In short, while we might hope that the process of transition will inspire
some to take responsibility for their contributions to past abuses and to
express those sentiments by apologizing and making sincere offers of
material reparation, experience and common sense suggest that this will be
the exception rather than the rule. The atonement model, while attractive
in the abstract, therefore holds little practical promise, leaving justice at
the whim of former abusers who have little motivation to apologize at all,
much less with the sincerity required to achieve atonement. These
difficulties are not resolved by turning to collective apologies. Just as with
other forms of collective responsibility, the expectations and requirements
of atonement devolve upon individuals. Without the full and meaningful
engagement of individual citizens, the apologies of political leaders are
symbolic in the pejorative.
These concerns certainly should trouble any advocate of the atonement
model of reparations. However, the most compelling objections are
revealed when we turn to the role played by former victims in the
atonement scheme. According to advocates, atonement is a reciprocal
relationship between abuser and victim. 259 Atonement requires not only a
sincere, self-generated apology, but also acceptance and forgiveness by
former victims. 260 This implies that genuine apology constitutes a
redeemable claim for forgiveness by a former abuser and a consequent
duty on the part of victims to forgive. In Brooks’s view, for example, a
genuine apology coupled with a substantial offer of reparation constitutes
a “civic subpoena,” imposing upon victims a “civic responsibility to
forgive and thereby begin the process or repairing a broken
257. See S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009).
258. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 201–02; Colvin, supra note 38, at 193.
259. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 273.
260. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at
255; Jens Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 195, 207 (2008).
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relationship.” 261 This view is not only incoherent, it is oppressive, denies
the dignity of victims, and constitutes a perpetuation of abuse.
Like apology, forgiveness is a spontaneous subjective mental state with
no procedural or ontological predicates.262 A victim will forgive or not as
she will; the decision lays solely within her power.263 Forgiveness is never
owed. 264 There are no objective conditions of sufficiency and there
certainly are no standard conditions the fulfillment of which makes
forgiveness necessary. 265 Furthermore, giving an apology on the condition
that forgiveness will be owed renders the sincerity of the apology suspect.
Some victims of atrocity may choose to forgive, but many will not.266 To
ignore, and thereby fail to respect, the authority of victims not to forgive is
to deny their dignity and autonomy. 267 The oppressiveness of such a
demand is only magnified if, as Martha Minow has suggested, forgiveness
entails or invites forgetting past wrongs. 268
An objective demand for forgiveness imposes upon the victim a duty
that is not hers. 269 More dangerous still, it implies that the victim is to
blame if she declines or refuses to forgive. Any effort to enforce an
obligation to forgive by, say, withholding reparations payments, just
makes matters worse and carries a flavor of abuse and manipulation.
Reparations movements simply cannot engage in such behavior and still
carry the mantle of justice. To claim otherwise, as the atonement model
does and must in order to pursue its vision of interpersonal
reconciliation, 270 just raises anew the specter of abuse.
The very idea of demanding apology and forgiveness—and the
prospect of enforcing those demands—is sufficient to demonstrate that the
atonement model is in some combination incoherent, oppressive, or facile.
Such demands simply do not comport with the moral foundations of
apology and forgiveness. To ignore that incoherence is to engage in a new
round of abuse. Alternatively, to respect those limitations and simply hope
that abusers will apologize and victims forgive puts the project of
261. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 68.
262. Panu Minkkinen, Ressentiment as Suffering: On Transitional Justice and the Impossibility of
Forgiveness, 19 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 513, 515 (2007).
263. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 20.
264. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 213–14.
265. Minow, Memory, supra note 74, at 18.
266. Id.
267. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 17.
268. Id. at 14–19.
269. Minow, Memory, supra note 74, at 18.
270. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at
255.
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transitional justice on wholly uncertain grounds without any procedural
guarantees. 271 The only way to avoid both horns of this dilemma is to set
aside atonement as the organizing goal of transitional justice and
reparations. Atonement should, of course, be encouraged and celebrated
where it occurs, 272 but it simply cannot carry the normative and practical
burdens of transitional justice generally and reparations specifically.
C. Transformative Justice
Some scholars have argued for reparations not on terms of
accountability but with a focus on social transformation.273 Titled
variously as “transformative justice,” 274 “restorative justice,” 275 or “social
healing,” 276 these approaches to reparations are mostly or entirely
prospective 277 and consequentialist, 278 measured and justified by the larger
project of “promot[ing] healing” 279 or “reconciliation.” 280 This is a goal
shared with atonement theories. However, unlike atonement,
transformative justice and reconciliation focus less on assuming blame,
favoring instead the goal of “internal healing.”281
The modern historical genesis of transformative justice is in the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). There, confronted
with a past marked by institutionalized violence, the newly elected
representatives of the post-Apartheid government faced the familiar
questions ubiquitous among transitions: “Shall we punish or offer
amnesty?” and “Shall we linger on the past or indulge in oblivion and just
271. See BORAINE, supra note 46, at 213–14 (noting that many victims of Apartheid chose not to
forgive their abusers, even after the abusers appeared before the TRC).
272. Id. at 214–15.
273. See, e.g., IFILL, supra note 64, at 128–31; Eric Yamamoto et al., American Justice on Trial—
Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1269, 1335 (2003); Eric Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the
Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 52 (2007) [hereinafter Yamamoto et al., American Reparations].
274. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L
LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2001–2002))
275. See, e.g., MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 91; Laplante & Theidon,
supra note 46, at 248.
276. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 3.
277. Matsuda, supra note 106, at 397; cf. Fortson, supra note 91, at 122 (focusing on capacity for
reparations to effect a redistribution of resources deemed unjust in light of past wrongs).
278. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 4 (contending that reparation is
not an “end in itself, but instead [i]s an integral aspect of the larger project of social healing”).
279. Jordan, supra note 94, at 25.
280. IFILL, supra note 64, at 131; Meierhenrich, supra note 260, at 196.
281. Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 81, 90, 96 (1999); Jordan,
supra note 94, at 25.
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move on?” Relying on indigenous concepts of justice based on “ubuntu,”
leaders of the transition, most prominently Nelson Mandela, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, and Alex Boraine, settled on the TRC as the locus of
transitional justice efforts. 282 By design, the TRC traded truth for
punishment, offering amnesty to all former abusers who came forward and
offered truthful and complete testimony. 283 The hope was that by shining a
light on the past and removing the threat of prosecution, the TRC could
transform society and reconcile victims and abusers even if they did not
apologize and forgive.
While ubuntu, both within and between different African traditions, is
elusive, the fundamental focus is on interconnectedness. 284 Individuals are
conceived of as artifacts of social connections. 285 They feel that
connection such that they are diminished when others are harmed and
raised when others are respected. 286 The consequence of putting ubuntu at
the core of transitional justice is to place priority on rebuilding social
connections among members of society going forward. 287 Reconciliation
and institution building take precedence over punishment. Like atonement,
reconciliation as a goal for transitional justice puts a priority on outcomes.
Reparations are part of the process only where and to the extent that they
may serve the broader goal of reconciliation.288
Some reconciliation scholars are not so outcome oriented. They
emphasize process and dialogue as the key to reconciliation.289 In this
context, material reparations may provide an important locus for
dialogue. 290 That was a self-conscious goal of the TRC, which appreciated
the importance of letting victims tell their stories in their own words in
order to provide a moment of recognition. Particularly in the domestic
282. BORAINE, supra note 251, at 268; DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT
FORGIVENESS 45 (1999); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the
‘Rule of Law’”, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2335 (2003) [hereinafter Ehrenreich Brooks]; Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS,
supra note 21, at 770, 771, 773 [hereinafter Reconciliation Act]; see also State v. Makwanyane 1995
(3) SA 391 (CC) at 84–85 (S. Afr.) (Chaskalson, C.J., relying in part on “ubuntu” to hold the death
penalty unconstitutional).
283. Reconciliation Act, supra note 282, at 773.
284. TUTU, supra note 282, at 31–32.
285. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 215.
286. TUTU, supra note 282, at 31–32; Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUST. 47, 52 (1997).
287. TUTU, supra note 282, at 54–55.
288. Id. at 45, 61.
289. See, e.g., IFILL, supra note 64, at 131.
290. Raymond Winbush, Reparations Conference Keynote Speech: Should America Pay?, in 2
AM. U. MODERN AM. 43, 44 (2006).
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reparations context, many scholars also highlight the value of keeping
alive the memory of past abuses and highlighting the need to correct
present inequities. 291 This dialogical process also promises a more
expansive historical record292 than might be accomplished in the narrow
confines of criminal trials or tort claims. 293 Finally, if they are transparent,
the procedures designed around reconciliation can model public
procedures and provide legitimacy for the new regime. 294
There is much to recommend reconciliation as a guide in transitions
generally and for reparations in particular. The principal concerns are
imprecision and mission creep. As Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein
have pointed out, “There is no theoretical foundation that underlies the
concept of social repair.”295 Too often in elaborating the fundamental
insights of reconciliation, advocates alternatively collapse into
atonement 296 or indulge in abstractions, failing to describe precisely both
the unique potential of process and, derivatively, what “reconciliation”
would mean in light of a commitment to process.297 That leaves
reparations claims based on reconciliation bereft of clarity as to
justification and form. As a consequence, familiar objections based on
ethical individualism make an easy reappearance. These blame games, 298
far from sponsoring reconciliation, only serve to reinforce lines of
division. 299
D. Rapid Social Change
One of the great strengths—and weaknesses—of utilitarian analyses of
legal issues is that troubling but abstract moral issues seldom gain much
traction. Given this, it is perhaps ironic that Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule identify “ethical individualism” as a key component of the
debate about reparations. 300 Setting aside these sorts of deontological
concerns, Saul Levmore argued some ten years ago that reparations and
291. Paterson, supra note 101, at 19–20.
292. Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Jordan, supra note 94, at 25.
293. IFILL, supra note 64, at 126, 128–31.
294. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 175–76; Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note
273, at 64–74.
295. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 618 (2002).
296. See, e.g., Meierhenrich, supra note 260, at 206–07 (“Forgiveness is a necessary condition for
reconciliation . . . .”).
297. Id. at 196–97 (citing Dwyer, supra note 281, at 81–82).
298. Brophy, supra note 54, at 135–36.
299. See Jordan, supra note 94, at 23.
300. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 698.
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other posthoc compensation policies ought to be features of regulatory
change. 301 Professor Levmore, and others who have looked at the problem
of retroactivity using tools from law and economics and public choice, 302
concede that there are elements of unfairness inherent in retroactive
compensation for violations of “new” norms. Nevertheless, they maintain
that retroactive reparations ought to be standard policy in some contexts in
order to encourage anticipatory change.
The insight is straightforward. Assume that widget manufacturing
requires the combustion of a particularly noxious chemical resulting in the
release of a carcinogenic agent. Emission control technology is available,
but would add one unit of cost to each widget, an expense the
manufacturer cannot pass along to its customers and still remain
competitive on price. In the absence of regulations limiting emissions or
requiring controls, the widget manufacturer is a present winner and future
loser. That is, in the present regulatory environment, polluting reduces
costs. However, that is a temporary condition. Pollution is not without
costs; failure to regulate simply shifts those costs to the public. As those
costs coalesce and become manifest, public policy will shift in favor of
stricter controls. When that day comes, the widget maker will be forced to
assume additional costs. Until then, it has no economic reason to adopt
more costly production methods. In fact, the widget maker has strong
economic incentives to obstruct and delay as long as it can.
From a policy perspective, this familiar incentive structure should find
no favor. It compromises public interests and imposes costs on innocent
parties. The solution, Levmore suggests, is retroactive enforcement.303
Establishing a habit and pattern of retroactive enforcement of new
regulations protects public interests by changing the incentive structure.304
Polluters usually have the best information regarding both the impact of
their practices and the technological options available to diminish those
impacts. They are, then, in the best position to anticipate regulatory
changes. 305 If polluters know that they will be held accountable for harms
accruing from the time when they knew or ought to have known about
production options that cause less environmental impact, then they will
301. Levmore, supra note 66.
302. See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions:
The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1978); Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986).
303. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1657–61.
304. Id. at 1663.
305. Id.
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have powerful incentives to regulate their own behavior on an anticipatory
basis. 306 Therefore, an aggressive approach to transition, characterized by
consistent pattern of implementing legal changes that reflect new
knowledge and technical capacity, coupled with retroactive enforcement,
will encourage polluters to react quickly in order to limit their future
retroactive liability. In the alternative, by delaying changes to the law and
their own behavior, polluters in an aggressive-change environment only
increase their future costs.
The potential application of this analysis to transitions is obvious.
Agents and subjects of pretransitional abuse will have less motivation to
continue abuses and otherwise delay transition if they know that they are
only adding to the consequences that inevitably will come. Policies of
retroactive reparation may even encourage earlier adoption of human
rights practices by adding costs to abusers who choose to delay. By
contrast, a general environment of impunity that is perfectly respectful of
basic principles of legality actually encourages abusive regimes to
continue with their activities and to delay transitional movements at all
costs.
While this approach is novel, Levmore recognizes that what may be
true for regulatory regimes found in stable states does not carry over to the
dramatic political change entailed in transitions to democracy. 307 The rapid
change hypothesis must assume that there is some external source of
change that makes liberal revolution and transition a relative certainty
from the point of view of those perpetrating bad acts under an abusive
regime. 308 In domestic regulatory environments, certainty of change is
provided by background regulatory schemes, governmental agencies,
advocacy groups, laws, and dedicated political units. Together these
entities ensure that regulations will move toward the “best” standards. To
posit that same certainty in the transitional justice context it is necessary to
make three difficult assumptions. The first is that there is a stable
background of human rights agencies that provide assurance of eventual
enforcement. Second, agents of abuse must consider themselves to be
within the present or future control of these agencies. Third, this purely
economic analysis assumes that abusers act out of self-interest that is both
narrow—bound to material gain—and enlightened—adopting a relatively
long-time horizon. None of these assumptions is warranted.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1686–98, 1700.
308. Id. at 1690–92.
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The economic advantage afforded abusers is bound up with sincerely
held ontological and teleological commitments backed by law. 309 These
abusive paradigms create for abusers a sense of entitlement and rationalize
abuse by marking victims as lesser beings with a dark future at the end of
history. 310 Consequently, there is much more than material wealth at stake
in preserving an abusive regime. For abusers, the prospect of social change
threatens core identities and jealously guarded ways of private and public
life. Commitments to preserve these lifeways provide a far more powerful
motive to maintain conditions of injustice than can be overcome by banal
material interests or even the abstract threat of punishment.311
Assumptions about the inevitability of social change are also suspect in
the context of pretransitional regimes. While the period since the 1948
signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has marked a new
era in internationalism and the progressive advancement of an
international system of human rights norms and transnational agencies
charged with reviewing and encouraging respect for these norms, there is
no organization with sovereign reach and authority sufficient to guarantee
the prosecution and punishment of all human rights violations. 312 Without
some certainty of both a normative shift toward the “best” laws and
eventual retroactive enforcement of these norms, the aggressive-change
hypothesis simply does not work for abusive regimes. 313
The subjective positions of abusers in pretransitional regimes further
indicate that the cognitive processes that ground the aggressive-change
hypothesis are not present in abusive regimes. Followers and leaders are
unlikely to see themselves as living under the authority of an international
or transnational human rights regime. 314 This is in part due to the reality of
the international system. It is also a reflection of the immediate
environment in abusive regimes. Most abusers are not high-level leaders
but, rather, are beholden to more immediate institutional norms supported
and enforced by an abusive regime. 315 Leaders, while perhaps directly
309. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–36.
310. Id. at 2632–34.
311. Id. at 2670: see also Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 282, at 2305. These matters often are
complex. For example, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, with many of their contemporaries,
admitted the evils of slavery but nevertheless could not bring themselves to abandon the practice for
fear of social and personal cost.
312. The International Criminal Court aspires to this role, but is saddled with limited jurisdiction
constrained by the consent of signatory nations. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, art. 4, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (2002).
313. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1680.
314. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2667–76.
315. Id. at 2671–72.
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exposed to international human rights institutions, are likely to see
themselves as immune from international agents and as preserving a way
of life in which they and their followers are deeply invested. 316 Given
these dispositions, abusers are likely to fight at all costs to stop liberal
revolutions and transitional movements that present a direct threat to their
beliefs, authority, wealth, and personal security. 317 Moreover, they have
more capacity to thwart transitions than do bit players in regulatory
schemes. 318 While a widget manufacturer knows that an anticipatory shift
in behavior will further his interests, the despot and his followers face
quite different consequences. Rather than merely altering their market,
anticipatory change guarantees total loss and potential criminal
prosecution.
The aggressive-change hypothesis also makes assumptions about the
shared interests and motives of those in a regulatory environment that may
not be apt in the transitional justice context. While it may be true that
governments, regulatory agencies, watchdog groups, and industries have a
set of shared interests that binds them together, this cannot be said of
abusers and the international human rights community. According to
aggressive change, industries and their regulators see their enterprises in
terms of long-term costs and benefits. Abusers do not see the world this
way. For abusers, anticipating change to reflect international human rights
norms is not a way to continue their business; it is the end of their
particular enterprise.319 A power plant would not anticipate regulatory
shifts to the point of closing its doors. We certainly would not expect a
successful abusive regime to close shop even if abusers know, in their
deepest hearts, that their regime one day will fall.
Some argue, not without merit, that amnesties and pardons are seldom
the key factors in catalyzing transitions, which may suggest that the threat
of obstruction suggested here is overblown. 320 A transition might, indeed,
be a historical inevitability, but leaders in the outgoing regime usually do
not see things this way. If leaders and other contributors to an abusive
regime are facing retroactive liability for reparations, then they have every
motivation to delay the transition by whatever means, and they are in a
316. Id. at 2676.
317. José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments:
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 3, 18–20 (Neil J. Kritz
ed., 1995).
318. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1680.
319. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 43–44, 64–66.
320. See, e.g., Douglass Cassel, International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN INST. Q.
77 (1993).
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position to add significantly to transitional costs even if they cannot stop
the transition altogether. 321 It is important to keep in mind that these costs
do not accrue to the international community. It seems unfair to establish
international policies based on abstract theory when the potential cost in
blood will be borne by an already victimized population.
Levmore, at least, shares in these concerns and therefore concludes that
reparations are only advisable in the transitional justice context after a
sufficient period of repose during which time the legal and social changes
attending transition have become well established. 322 However, there may
be one exception to this. International agents who benefit from human
rights abuses, such as corporations and financial institutions, may be
deterred from future dealings with abusive regimes if the international
human rights community, including states, transnational organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, consumers, and stockholders, can
establish reliable precedents for detecting and “punishing” beneficiaries
and opportunists in the business world. 323 Financial institutions might, as
an example, be motivated to use their informational advantage to avoid
dealing with human rights abusers if they know that they will be found out
and made to pay. Actions like those recently brought against Swiss banks
by Holocaust survivors might create just the reliable regulatory
environment that the aggressive-change hypothesis requires with respect
to truly international actors. 324 Serious doubts would remain with respect
to domestic agents.
321. Foday Sankoh represents a significant present-day example of this. He was able to exercise
considerable influence over the terms of the Lome Peace accords precisely because he represented a
present threat to peace and stability in Sierra Leone and because he approached the peace negotiations
with the subjective belief that he could fight into perpetuity if necessary rather than sacrifice his
primary goals of power-sharing, amnesty, and control of mineral resources—particularly diamonds.
See Michael O’Flaherty, Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights Community, 26
HUM. RTS. Q. 29, 33–35 (2004).
322. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1698–99.
323. Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 159–64.
324. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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IV. A LIMINAL ROLE FOR REPARATIONS IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
“Every human being is fated to be enmeshed in the power relations
he lives by.”
—Karl Jaspers 325
“Reparations” commonly are defined as “payment[s] justified on
backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather than forwardlooking grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing.” 326
Reparations are about remedying “long-ago crimes.” 327 While
straightforward enough, this definition is far too limiting in the transitional
justice context. 328 First, it is avowedly and exclusively retrospective. 329
Second, as is demonstrated by the expanded typology set forth above, the
category of “reparations” is much broader than is implied by a narrow
focus on compensation, whether construed historically or
counterfactually. 330 More problematic from a practical perspective is that
this constrained view of reparations makes almost inevitable objections
based on the common commitment that individuals can be held
accountable only for their own conduct and not that of others. 331 This
ethical individualism has significant resonance in the common law, and is
almost axiomatic in American criminal jurisprudence. Writing for the
Court in Morissette v. United States, 332 for example, Justice Jackson noted
that “an intense individualism” is at the heart of the “compound concept”
of criminal liability, constituted by the “concurrence of an evil-meaning
mind with an evil-doing hand” that “took deep and early root in American
325. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 34.
326. Rodney C. Roberts, The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation, in GENOCIDE’S
AFTERMATH 132 (Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007) (limiting the “species of justice”
to “distributive justice and rectificatory justice”); see also Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra
note 6, at 691.
327. Brophy, supra note 54, at 131.
328. IFILL, supra note 64, at 126, 128–31; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 272; Yamamoto
et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 35–37.
329. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 35–37.
330. Harris, supra note 79, at 1784. For a description of these two approaches to measuring harm
and compensation see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57 (1974); Joel Feinberg,
Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 7 (1992);
Roberts, supra note 326, at 133–34; see also Brophy, supra note 54, at 133 (noting that reparations
claims often rely on counterfactual measures).
331. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 703; see also Lee Harris, “Reparations”
as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409, 414–20 (2003).
332. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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soil.” 333 For the purpose of assigning criminal liability, the constraints
entailed by faith to ethical individualism are hard to contest. Indeed, I have
argued elsewhere that for most perpetrators and participants in
pretransitional abuses, criminal punishment cannot be imposed consistent
with faith to ethical individualism in the form of the legality principle.334
However, it is not at all clear that concern with ethical individualism is
relevant in reparations debates. To the contrary, the fact that reparations
proposals in the transitional justice context frequently confront seemingly
intractable objections based on ethical individualism is evidence of a
conceptual mistake in the form of a readiness to treat transitional justice as
a case of ordinary justice. 335 A more careful accounting of the unique
practical and normative conditions that define pretransitional abuses and
transitions to democracy holds significant hope for resolving frequent
objections to reparations as elements of a broader hybrid approach to
transitional justice, including limited criminal prosecutions and truth
commissions.
In addition to cash compensation, the reparations literature recognizes a
broad diversity of material reparations and more “symbolic” measures,
including apologies (whether private, public, or official), days of
remembrance, and monuments.336 One might regard these sorts of efforts
as “compensatory” in a broad sense. However they are much more than
that. In particular, they reflect a significant but little understood fact about
transitions: while even stable states constantly undergo change, transitions
present a uniquely liminal moment for societies “betwixt and between” 337
an abusive past and a future peace guarded and preserved by commitments
to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Recognizing the liminal
status of transitions provides valuable context for understanding the role of
reparations in transitions to democracy. In particular, it focuses attention
on the need in transition to assume the posture of Janus, facing
simultaneously the past and the future in order to recognize and by
affirmative steps correct, reform, and reshape the underlying causes of
pretransitional abuses. This duty to achieve justice for the future in light of
the past keeps faith with core transitional commitments to democracy,
333. Id. at 251–52 (1952).
334. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 1636–48.
335. See, e.g., Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Theoretical Underpinnings for Reparations: A
Constitutional Tort Perspective, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 3 (2003); Posner & Vermeule,
Ordinary Justice, supra note 176; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6.
336. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 725–36; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff supra note 54, at
330–32; Verdeja supra note 71, at 171–78.
337. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1.
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human rights, and the rule of law. Recognizing and enforcing such a duty
does not entail blame and therefore renders moot excuses based on ethical
individualism while avoiding the mistakes, pitfalls, and insufficiencies of
atonement, reconciliation, and other commonly discussed theories of
transitional justice.
A. Radical Evil 338 and Extraordinary Justice
I have argued elsewhere that prominent contributors to the transitional
justice literature misunderstand the nature of challenges in transition and
therefore miss significant theoretical and practical opportunities because
they view transitional justice as “ordinary justice.” 339 In particular, they
fail to take normative account of both the “justice gap” 340 (the radical
disparity between justice needs and resources available to transitional
regimes seeking some form of justice) and the underlying cause of that
gap (the complex of cultural norms, social practices, institutional regimes,
black letter law, official policies, institutional practices, social norms,
cultural ideology, and historical teleology) that together provide the
organizing ontology and justificatory ethic of abusive regimes and which
ratify, induce, and sustain programs of mass violence. 341 In those earlier
works, I argued that taking account of the unique features of
pretransitional atrocities, abusive regimes, and the transitions that follow
provides considerable assistance in understanding the justice gap and in
providing a framework for justifying and organizing programs of selective
prosecution 342 and posttransitional financial recovery. 343 By contrast,
ignoring these features and treating transitional justice as ordinary justice
(1) dooms transitions to accept the best justice possible; (2) inspires deep
suspicion in public institutions that appear to have only a limited or ad hoc
commitment to justice; (3) preserves a sense that those not prosecuted got
away with it, thereby opening the door to self-help solutions that threaten
338. I allude to NINO, supra note 109.
339. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2622, 2639–42; David C. Gray, What’s So Special
About Transitional Justice? Prolegomenon for an Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice,
100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 147, 148 (2006). Contra Posner & Vermeule, Ordinary Justice, supra
note 176.
340. Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice,
1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 35 (2007); Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2624–29.
341. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–36.
342. Id. at 2636–49.
343. Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 157–64.
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peace and stability; and (4) fails to provide a sensible model for justice
institutions established by a new regime. 344
That same short-sightedness is manifest in reparations debates. Here,
the mistake is to treat reparations as gap-filling measures, meant to
provide partial vindication for retributive impulses 345 or restitution claims
residual of the ordinary justice familiar in stable states. 346 This ordinaryjustice approach views reparations through a retrospective legal lens,
analogizing them to tort and quasi-tort remedies 347 that “provide payment
(in cash or in kind) . . . on the basis of wrongs . . . [for] which the payment
is justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice . . . .” 348
Even more creative proponents of alternative models, such as atonement,
maintain a retrospective focus. They just cast reparations in personal terms
by demanding apology and forgiveness.
Indulging this retrospective bias marks a serious mistake for
reparations advocates. Reparations, like criminal prosecution programs,
certainly must take account of the past. There is no doubt that reparations
programs are driven by past atrocities. However, as part of broader
transitional justice programs, reparations must cast an eye to the future as
part of a broader effort to sow the ground for future peace and stability. In
the transitional context, taking account of the past means much more than
documenting wrongdoing and measuring harm. Likewise, achieving
justice for the future means much more than shaking hands and moving
on. Justice in transition means recognizing past wrongs as oppositional
markers for future conduct and policy. Taking seriously this goal of
pursuing the future with a view toward the past requires as a first step
understanding the sources and causes of atrocities.
Anthropologist Victor Turner defines social paradigms as “sets of
‘rules’ from which many kinds of sequences of social action may be
generated but which further specify what sequences must be excluded.” 349
Paradigms draw and maintain social boundaries and designate roles and
positions for individuals within society. 350 As the rules governing
344. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2622.
345. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 284–87; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note
6, at 691.
346. Jordan, supra note 94, at 25; Shelton, supra note 94, at 844.
347. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 284–87.
348. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 691.
349. VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 17 (1974) [hereinafter TURNER,
DRAMAS].
350. MARC J. SWARTZ, VICTOR TURNER, & ARTHUR TUDEN, POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31
(1966).
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acceptable conduct and social identities, paradigms are both the subject
and the object of social action. That is, paradigms generate their own
subjects, but also compete with other paradigms. 351 As described by
Turner, paradigms bear a close resemblance to what Michel Foucault
describes as “regimes of truth”: the circular relationships between “Truth,”
conceived as “systems of ordered procedures for the production,
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements,” “systems
of power which produce and sustain [Truth],” and “effects of power which
[Truth] induces and which extend [Truth].”352 In abusive regimes the
dominant social paradigm demands, or at least tolerates, targeted abuse
against an identified group.353 These abusive paradigms, though as varied
as the capacity for creative evil resident in our species, 354 share a few
salient features. First, they tend to reduce society to a single dyadic
opposition with all subjects assigned to one side of a definitive line.355
Second, following this “bi-polar logic,” 356 an abusive paradigm
characterizes those in one group as subhuman and naturally subservient,357
or at least not people “like us,” 358 deserving of treatment as equals. Third,
those targeted for abuse are regarded as a persistent and emergent threat
against the survival of the dominant group and its ability to achieve its
rightful place at the end of history. 359
351. TURNER, DRAMAS, supra note 349, at 17.
352. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 109, 133 (1980). Foucault’s
less esoteric histories document the life in society of various regimes of truth. See, e.g., MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1995) (criminology); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (1988)
(psychology).
353. See MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE (1993); GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233,
at 27–163, 416–54 (1996); GOUREVITCH, supra note 233, at 47–62, 96–131; INDEPENDENT INT’L
COMM’N ON KOSOVO, KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED
33–64 (2000); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
(2002); Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 59 (2002); Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 29–99;
Nino, supra note 109, at 41–60; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–15.
354. See Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 4 (“[A]ll societies have the capacity to do
evil. No society holds a monopoly on the commission of human injustices, nor is any society
exempted. To Max Frankel’s question—‘Is there a beast in each of us waiting to be unleashed by
extraordinary fear, greed or fury?’—I would have to answer, yes.”).
355. Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 29–99; see also ELSTER, supra note 19, at 93.
356. Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 83–89.
357. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 267; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–15.
358. Fortson, supra note 91, at 77 (“Whiteness is based principally on the oppression of minority
groups by defining them as Other.”) (citing Harris, supra note 79, at 1737).
359. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 3–24, 49–50; SIMON WIESENTHAL, THE SUNFLOWER: ON
THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS 15 (1997); see also Swartz, Turner, & Tuden, supra
note 350, at 15 (attaching conformance to consensual power and to the preservation of a desired social
order).

1098

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:1043

The role of an abusive paradigm at the core of pretransitional abuses is
widely recognized in the transitional justice literature.360 Roy Brooks, for
example, has noted that “atrocities can only occur when the perpetrator
fails to identify with [his] victims and fails to recognize a common
humanity between [himself] and the victims.” 361 Richard Rorty echoed
this view in an essay on the Balkans, noting that those who participate in
mass atrocities do not regard their victims as “fellow human beings,” but
as mere “animals” or, at best, “pseudohumans.” 362 In a variation on the
theme, Daniel Goldhagen has argued that, like the German perpetrators of
the Holocaust, “the Argentine [and] Chilean murderers of people who
opposed the recent authoritarian regimes thought that their victims should
die” and that “Tutsis who slaughtered Hutus in Burundi [and] Hutus who
slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda . . . [and] Serbs who have killed Croats or
Bosnian Muslims, did so out of conviction in the justice of their
actions.” 363 Philip Gourevitch has seconded Goldhagen’s assessment of
the Rwandan genocide, adding that genocide is “an exercise in community
building” for abusers. 364 W.E.B. Du Bois linked racial oppression to, inter
alia, German abuse of Jews, noting the centrality of intergroup fear at the
heart of violence. 365 In her careful history of twentieth-century lynching on
the eastern shore of Maryland, Sherrilyn Ifill documents “the role of
ordinary members of the community in supporting or condoning [lynching
as an] act of racial terrorism,” linking that support to a background racism
that cast blacks as dangerous, prone to violence, and lesser evolved.366
While assault, rape, and murder are relatively infrequent and broadly
condemned in stable states, the paradigm that holds sway in pretransitional
regimes provides a view of the world for abusers in which that same
conduct targeted against members of a specific group 367 is at least not
360. See PHILLIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 296 (2007); Roberta Senechal de la Roche, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 SOC.
FORUM 97, 106 (1996); Roberta Senechal de la Roche, The Sociogenesis of Lynching, in UNDER
SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 48 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997).
361. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 267.
362. Rorty, supra note 232, at 112.
363. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 14–15.
364. GOUREVITCH, supra note 233, at 95.
365. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Shape of Fear, reprinted in THE SOCIAL THEORY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS
56 (Phil Zuckerman ed., 2004).
366. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 43–44, 64–66.
367. Brooks, supra note 6, at 3–11; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112 (Rorty writes about
dehumanization of targets for violence in the Balkans, noting that “they are not doing these things to
fellow human beings, but to Muslims” who are regarded as “pseudohumans.” He then connects that
ontologically grounded targeting to Jefferson’s ability to both own slaves and to “think it self-evident
that all men were endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights.”).
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prohibited, and more often is a moral or historical imperative. That public
sanction often manifests subjectively as a sense of entitlement on the part
of abusers. 368 They are “willing executioners” 369 because they are
defending their view of the world and carrying out their destiny as a
people, group, or society. 370 That individual willingness, cast widely, is the
animating core of abusive regimes and provides a descriptive explanation
for the large numbers and broad array of individuals implicated in acts of
violence. 371
Some form of abusive paradigm is at the heart of all mass violence. In
some cases abusive paradigms are motivators, in other cases simple
catalysts. In all cases, however, some socio-normative grounding is a sine
qua non for pretransitional violence.372 To argue the contrary is to claim
that mass violence is mere happenstance, a coincidence of uncoordinated
and independent action by thousands or tens of thousands of unconnected
agents. That view is simply not tenable and bears no descriptive weight. It
is the role played by an abusive paradigm that distinguishes pretransitional
violence from the common street violence more familiar in stable states.
B. Repairing Paradigms of Abuse
This Article contends that most of the reparations literature evidences
one or both of two conceptual biases. First, most reparations proposals
follow a tort model familiar from ordinary justice which focuses on
compensating harm. Second, most reparations proposals evidence a
temporal bias. Most are exclusively retrospective, but some, including
atonement, evidence a prospective bias. By succumbing to one or both of
these theoretical mistakes, most reparations proposals open the door to
objections based on ethical individualism. Those objections only appear to
have merit if the discussion of reparations is limited to backward-facing
justifications. As is suggested here, transitional justice is by definition
Janus-faced. It begs the question to define any particular policy of
transitional justice as exclusively retrospective or exclusively prospective.
More troubling, however, is the fact that these biases lead advocates to
misunderstand the fundamental challenge in transitions to democracy and
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See, e.g., GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 14–15.
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233.
See supra notes 358–66.
JASPERS, supra note 15, at 34–35.
See Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–16.
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therefore to miss the strongest normative case for reparations as part of a
broader effort to achieve justice in transition.
Transitions and, therefore, transitional justice programs, live in an
explicitly liminal 373 space between the downfall of the abusive regime and
the reintegration of members, victims, and abusers alike into a fully
reconstituted successor regime. In this land “betwixt and between,”374
transitional justice can only be understood as processes of symbolic,
material, and substantive transformation, defined by the project of
recognizing victims, achieving an acceptable level of parity among victims
and abusers, instantiating necessary reforms of public institutions, and
reforming official and public practices. Putting the question this way
makes the solution to the reparations conundrum described in this Article
relatively straightforward. Answering the call of “Nunca Mas” 375 requires
situating reparations and other elements of a transitional justice program in
the broader liminal process of transition.
Taking the transitional justice project seriously reveals a significant
distinction between reparations as part of a liminal process and tort awards
or other compensatory measures. Even the most apparently compensatory
reparations that might, in the stable state context, accomplish nothing
more than restoration of the status quo ante, retain both a forward- and
backward-looking face in the transitional justice context.376 That is
because reparations, as part of the process of transition, are always cast
against the backdrop of an abusive society and its attendant paradigms.
Reparations, therefore, are illuminated by the past. At the same time, as
part of a project designed to achieve sustainable peace, justice, security,
and the rule of law in and post transition, reparations also cast an image on
the future. As a utopian project, transitional reparations must be justified
by the goal of achieving reconstruction and reform. In particular,
reparations must reflect the primary goal of achieving new social and
material conditions 377 for former victims and new relationships between
373. I adopt the term “liminal” from the anthropological literature on rites of passage. See, e.g.,
TURNER, DRAMAS, supra note 349; TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1; VICTOR TURNER,
THE RITUAL PROCESS (1969); V. W. TURNER, SCHISM AND CONTINUITY IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A
STUDY OF NDEMBU VILLAGE LIFE (1957); ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (1960).
374. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1.
375. Nat’l Comm’n on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), The Doctrine Behind the
Repression, in NUNCA MÁS (NEVER AGAIN) pt. 5, available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/
nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_281.htm.
376. Fortson, supra note 91, at 123.
377. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 107–20 (2000); Hall, supra
note 100, at 8.
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members of former abuser and victim groups. 378 This last is a crucial
measure of the transitional process. Transitions must achieve a sustainable
new equilibrium among members of groups whose identities in the past
marked the line between abuser and abused—lines that rendered abuse
rational or necessary in relation to group identity and goals.
To borrow from John Rawls, transitional states are “burdened”
societies. 379 Those burdens are many, but what Rawls highlights is the
social and structural weight of an abusive paradigm. 380 The highest
imperatives in transition are (1) to elaborate that paradigm, and (2) to
develop and deploy public policies. Those polices must be capable both of
deconstructing the ontological and teleological commitments core to that
abusive paradigm and of putting the abusive paradigm’s animating
classificatory structure in a broader social context that evidences a healthy
diversity of overlapping associations and oppositions. 381 This proposal is a
bit abstract. While full elaboration of the approach proposed here must
wait for another day, 382 it is worth a moment in closing to suggest one
application and how the approach commended here can respond to or
avoid objections inspired by ethical individualism.
The targeted violence characteristic of abusive regimes expresses a
persistent social ontology and historical teleology that places individuals
in a normalized hierarchical typology, identifying members of specified
groups as subhuman and therefore rightful targets of abuse. That is,
abusive regimes “institutionalize[] patterns of cultural value that
pervasively deny some members the recognition they need in order to be
full, participating partners in social interaction.”383 Treating reparations as
liminal tools of transition reveals their potential to reconstruct both society
and its constituents before reintegrating them into a posttransitional world.
First, reparations provide a formal and official recognition of past
wrongs. However, the focus is not on measuring harm. Rather, the
justification and goal is to situate victims in a developing social context
378. Fraser, supra note 111; Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics?, 18 THEORY, CULTURE &
SOC’Y 21–42 (2001).
379. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 5, 106 (1999).
380. Id.
381. Cf. MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA 17–26 (1956) (describing role of
overlapping political identities in maintaining political stability); Kanchan Chandra, Ethnic Parties
and Democratic Stability, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 235, 236, 242 (2005) (same).
382. See David Gray, Constitutional Faith and Dynamic Stability: Thoughts on Religion,
Constitutions, and Transitions to Democracy, 69 MD. L. REV. 26 (2009) (describing the role of
religion in achieving and maintaining dynamic stability in plural societies); David Gray, Extraordinary
Justice (draft on file with author).
383. Fraser, supra note 111, at 49.
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where they are identified as individuals capable of being wronged. 384
Recognizing harm, then, is an exercise in using the past as a point of
contrast, illuminating, guiding, and regulating a present and future
commitment to parity385 between those who populated the social
categories of victim and abuser.
Second, the form of any reparation should be justified by and measured
according to the goal of reshaping status arrangements among former
victims and abusers. 386 A public apology by state officials is a good start.
It recognizes past wrongs and the wrong thinking that led to abuses.
However, public recognition, even if heartfelt, may not be sufficient to
provide victims with the material conditions necessary to achieve,
maintain, and exercise equal status.387 Again cast in the light of
deprivations characteristic of systematic abuse, transitions frequently will
need to provide some form of material reparation. The form will be highly
context dependent. 388 If the abusive paradigm that held sway in the past
systematically denied those in the targeting group with fair and equal
access to housing, for example, then reparations in the form of loan
programs or building projects may be necessary to put victims on equal
footing going forward. 389 Similarly, if the abusive paradigm that
dominated the past regime systematically denied those in the targeted
group access to economic, social, and political opportunities that serve as
gateways to full status, such as education, then reparations in the form of
access guarantees, integration, preschool and tutoring programs, and
targeted institutional development may be necessary to accelerate the
arrival of former victims into circles of privilege and power.390 However,
neither in form nor scope can reparations be justified by an exclusively
384. Brandon Hamber & Richard A. Wilson, Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and
Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies, 1 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (2002).
385. Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 99, 107, 108–12 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna
McGregor eds., 2008).
386. Verdeja, supra note 71, at 167.
387. See Ellen Waldman, Restorative Justice and the Pre-Conditions for Grace: Taking Victim’s
Needs Seriously, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 93 (2007) (“Victims of serious crime and
violation may need more tangible help . . . before they can be expected to dispense the spiritual balm
and experience the psychological release that restorative theorists envision.”).
388. See Daly, supra note 70, at 77–78 (arguing that transitional periods are periods of social
transformation away from past abuses such that the transitional approach must be highly particularized
to the local context).
389. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64.
390. Fraser, supra note 111, at 73; Erika R. George, After Atrocity Examples from Africa: The
Right to Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. INT’L L.
REV. 59, 78–85 (2008).
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retrospective focus on compensating for past harms. Rather, out of respect
for the liminal status of transitions and the unique goals of transitional
justice, reparations programs must specify the source and form of past
wrongs, identify constraints on individual and broader social justice, and
tailor reparations strategies that enhance the ability of former victims to
participate as equals in society, culture, politics, and the economy. 391
V. CONCLUSION
While further elaboration of the approach to reparations as part of a
broader transitional justice program must wait for another day, its potential
to avoid or moot common objections motivated by ethical individualism is
apparent. The goal in transition is not to return from a high-point of mass
atrocity to a baseline of persistent injustice—the view that is implied by
tort models and counterfactual measures of harm. 392 Rather, the animating
justification for transitional justice is to open a society up entirely, to
examine and correct the causes of abuse, and to exploit positively the
liminal period of transition to achieve the cognitive and structural changes
that will ensure peace, justice, and stability going forward. This is an
obligation to justice that inheres to every transitional society and to each
of its members in the wake of institutionalized human rights abuses.
Objections to reparation such as “It wasn’t me” that reflect a background
commitment to ethical individualism are therefore non sequiturs. For heirs
to an abusive paradigm, there simply is no excuse for refusing to make it
right.
391. Kristen McConnachie & John Morison, Constitution-Making, Transition and the
Reconstitution of Society, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 75, 88–96 (Kieran McEvoy &
Lorna McGregor eds., 2008).
392. See De Greiff, supra note 30, at 457; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 325.

